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SYNOPSIS
Impact fees are increasingly viewed as a way to meet the public
infrastructure and service needs of growing communities. To
some, they represent the wave of the future; to others they repre-
sent an unjustified shift away from the traditional notion that the
general public should bear the cost of public facilities, not just new
development. Impact fees have been given many different labels
and definitions. This Article analyzes the evolution of impact fees
in a number of states that have had the longest experience with
impact fees to determine how more than a decade of legislation
and litigation has changed the form and substance of local impact
fee ordinances in those states.
1. Note: This Article was developed from a paper presented by Brian Blaesser at the
1989 Institute on Zoning & Planning which was co-sponsored by the Department of
Urban & Regional Planning at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana and the
Illinois Chapter of the American Planning Association.
2. Attorney, Rudnick & Wolfe, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Brown University; J.D.,
Boston College Law School; M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr.
Blaesser specializes in real estate, land use, planning law and litigation, and serves as
counsel to both private and public sector clients throughout the United States.
3. Associate, Siemon, Larsen & Purdy, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., Mount Holyoke
College; M.R.P./J.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ms. Kentopp
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I. INTRODUCTION
Impact fees are a relatively new local government technique for
funding capital facilities needed to serve new development in high
growth areas of the country. As with most regulations, states differ in
their approaches to impact fees. For example, Arizona's development
fee legislation, adopted in 1982, is very broad in the range of public
improvements funded and the scope of local discretion to determine
how fees should be calculated. Florida, which has dealt with impact
fees for more than a decade, does not yet have specific state impact fee
legislation; instead it has relied on judicial opinions to define the con-
tours of constitutionally valid impact fees.4 Learning from over a dec-
ade of litigation in Florida and other "high-growth" states, Texas
adopted the first general legislation in the country for "true" impact
fees in 1987, creating a model for other high-growth states like Illinois,
Tennessee and Virginia. In those states, strict judicial attitudes toward
development regulations and fees had generally precluded the use of
impact fees without enabling legislation. Despite the differing sources
of authority for the "first generation" of impact fees in the various
states, the common characteristics of the "second generation" of im-
pact fees are the heightened level of detail, reduced local discretion to
4. tn 1985, the Florida legislature authorized the use of impact fees as a growth
management technique under its amended Growth Management Act, Part II, which
encourages the use of innovative capital facilities financing mechanisms, including im-
pact fees. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163 (West 1972 & Supp. 1990).
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determine the types of facilities funded and related standards, the
classes of fee payers and the amounts of fees.
Part I of this Article presents necessary background for a clearer
understanding of the "second generation" impact fee legislation de-
scribed in Part II. The implications of new impact fee legislation for
local governments that are not covered under the new legislation is
discussed at the end of Part II. The remainder of this Article addresses
some of the ongoing legal dilemmas regarding the use of various types
of exactions (Part III) and new developments in the implementation of
impact fee ordinances (Part IV).
A. The Capital Facilities Financing Dilemma
Since the beginning of suburbanization and migration to warmer cli-
mates, local governments in growing communities have struggled to
provide new infrastructure and services for their swelling populations.
In Illinois, for example, the legal battles over who should bear the cost
of new growth and development began in the 1950s, with the flight of
urban populations to large, suburban tract developments requiring new
roads, water, sewer, schools and parks. 5 Fortunately for contemporar-
ies of that post-war era, the federal government funded most of those
public facilities. Even then, however, the courts were asked to decide
who should pay for the costs of growth.6
1. Governments' Responses to the Dilemma
In the early 1950s, long-term, general obligation debt accounted for
roughly half of capital improvement funds. During the next two de-
cades, federal grants became the dominant funding source, comprising
more than forty percent of state and local capital funds by the early
1970s.7 Taxes and special assessments comprised the other primary
5. See generally RESIDENTIAL PLANNING CORPORATION, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF
GROWTH: AN EVALUATION OF THE FISCAL EFFECT OF RESIDENTIAL GROWTH UPON
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN LAKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS (prepared for The Homeowner-
ship Institute, December, 1988); C. HAAR, THE END OF INNOCENCE: A SUBURBAN
READER (1972).
6. See, eg., People ex rel. County of Du Page v. Smith, 21 Ill. 2d 572, 173 N.E.2d
485 (1961) (describing population growth in Du Page County in the context of deter-
mining the validity of County-imposed water and sewer connection fees); Associated
Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630,
appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
7. J. PETERSEN & R. FORBES, INNOVATIVE CAPITAL FINANCING, AMERICAN
PLANNING ASSOCIATION, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT No. 392 (1985).
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sources of funding. With federal funding now greatly reduced in an era
of budget deficits, local governments have been forced to increase local
taxes and reduce local spending.
Not surprisingly, increased reliance on the property tax resulted in
taxpayer revolts in several states (e.g., California, Massachusetts). Left
with few alternatives, strapped local governments have sought to re-
strain new growth and development and, in effect, impose a mandate:
"No public facilities, no development permit." To enforce this man-
date, city governments in many growing communities rewrote local
codes to include provisions for mandatory dedication of land on subdi-
vision plats, or fees in lieu of dedication. The requirement that devel-
opers dedicate land, or fees in lieu of dedication or specific types of
facilities within their subdivisions, as a condition to plat approval is
now specifically authorized by statutes in many states.3 Impact fees are
also now expressly authorized by statute in a number of states.9
The legal battles fought in the 1950s and 1960s over dedication and
reservation requirements are often cited in current impact fee litiga-
tion. In addition, the constitutional tests developed to ensure that
there is some relationship between the required dedication and the
need for public facilities have carried over into impact fee cases.
2. Early Experience with Exactions and Impact Fees
Early during the suburban boom, many state courts held that it was
unconstitutional to require a single development to bear the entire cost
of major public improvements. However, this constitutional limitation
did not preclude local governments from requiring each new develop-
ment to pay a "fair share fee," which reflects that portion of the total
cost that is attributable to the need created by that development.1° Im-
8. See, eg., COLORADO REv. STAT. § 30-28-133(4)(a)(II) (1973) (subdivision en-
abling legislation authorizing regulations requiring dedication of school sites or pay-
ment of money in lieu, when "reasonably necessary" to serve the proposed subdivision);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.358 (West 1989) (authorizing municipalities to require, as a
condition for subdivision approval, dedication of a "reasonable portion" of subdivision
property for parks and playgrounds or cash equivalent).
9. See infra notes 50-85 and accompanying text (discussion of impact fee
legislation).
10. See discussion of early Florida impact iee cases in Smith, From Subdivision Im-
provement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A
Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 16-19
(1987); Home Builders & Contractors Association v. Board of County Commissioners
of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 451 So.
2d 848, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984) (upholding "fair share" road impact fee).
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
60 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:55
pact fees were conceived as a mechanism to offset the growth costs
resulting from the need for large-scale public improvements located off-
site of new developments. These fees also had the potential to satisfy
developers' need for more predictable development costs as compared
to negotiated developer contributions.
A. CALIFORNIA'S MANDATORY DEDICATION
Although early courts had few difficulties with mandatory dedica-
tion requirements for public road and park improvements within a pro-
posed subdivision, the idea of requiring mandatory dedication of off-
site improvements was less palatable. A 1949 California case, Ayres v.
City Council,"1 was among the earliest to approve local regulations re-
quiring the dedication of an additional right-of-way along an existing
public street bordering on a proposed subdivision. Other courts later
cited the case for the proposition that mandatory dedication require-
ments need not necessarily fulfill solely the needs of a proposed subdi-
vision. The Ayres court held that where the dedication of a right-of-
way "is a condition reasonably related to increased traffic and other
needs of [a] proposed subdivision it is voluntary in theory and not con-
trary to constitutional concepts."12 The court upheld the exaction
based in part on the theory that government approval is a privilege or
benefit to which the government may impose reasonable conditions. 13
In the landmark 1971 case of Associated Home Builders v. City of
Walnut Creek,14 the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its deference
to local regulations conditioning development approval on the dedica-
tion of land or fees-in-lieu. The court's sympathy for the mandatory
open space regulations in Associated Home Builders was based in part
on the "urgent needs caused by present and anticipated future popula-
tion growth" and the "disappearance of open land." 15 These problems
have served as the basis for a broad array of new development fees
under recent legislative enactments.
Nearly forty years after Ayres, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a
beach access exaction in the famous exactions case of Nollan v. Califor-
11. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
12. Id. at 40, 207 P.2d at 8.
13. Id.
14. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971).
15. Id. at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
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nia Coastal Commission,16 which established a heightened level of judi-
cial scrutiny in exactions cases.
B. ILLINOIS SUBDIVISION EXACTIONS
Illinois' earliest exactions case, decided in 1956, upheld the authority
of local governments to require developers to install curbs and gutters
along dedicated roads in a proposed subdivision. 7 Five years later,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Village of Mount Prospect plan that required the mandatory dedica-
tion of land for school and park uses on the site of a proposed 250-unit
subdivision because it was not "specifically and uniquely attributable"
to the proposed development. 18
The most significant factor in the evolution of exactions law in Illi-
nois was the amendment of the state constitution in 1970 to give cer-
tain municipalities and counties home rule power, except in subject
areas where the state legislature expressly reserved power. The types
of exactions that have been litigated since the home rule amendment to
the Illinois Constitution in 1970 include:
* mandatory dedication of school sites and recreation sites;19
* mandatory dedication of school site plus cash toward con-
struction of the school;20
* cash contributions to the local school district;21
* recording of a restrictive covenant limiting the use of land and
the dedication of a 50-foot strip of land for road purposes;22
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See infra notes 114-78 and accompanying text, discussing
the potential effect of Nollan on state constitutional standards.
17. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
18. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 InI. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961). It was in this landmark case that the Illinois Supreme Court articu-
lated more fully the "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard for determining
the constitutional validity of developer exactions. Id. at 379, 176 N.E.2d at 801.
19. Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 68 IMI. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (condition
to subdivision approval).
20. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 68, Du Page County v. Surety Devel-
opers, Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975) (condition to issuance of a special use
permit).
21. Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1974) (condition to
the issuance of a special use permit).
22. Ziemer v. County of Peoria, 33 Ill. App. 3d 612, 338 N.E.2d 145 (1975) (condi-
tion to rezoning approval).
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* construction of a gasification plant;23 and
* conveyance of land and payment of funds to a local school
district.
24
Not suprisingly, home rule power is often a crucial source of authority
for impact fee ordinances adopted in states that do not yet have express
impact fee legislation.
C. WISCONSIN SCHOOL AND PARK DEDICATION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court made its significant contribution to
exactions law in the 1966 case of Jordan v. Menomonee Fails.25 The
case involved a challenge to local subdivision regulations requiring the
mandatory dedication of land or fees in lieu of land for school or recre-
ation purposes. The Jordan court rejected the stringent standard
adopted by Illinois courts that exactions are only valid if the local gov-
ernment can prove that the exaction is "specifically and uniquely at-
tributable" to a proposed development. The court reasoned that "[i]n
most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove
that the land required to be dedicated for a park or a school site was to
meet a need solely attributable to the anticipated influx of people into
the community to occupy [a] particular subdivision."'26 In the court's
view, the fact that others outside a subdivision might use the required
roads or sidewalks did not invalidate the exaction. This case laid the
legal foundation for later cases upholding similar exactions under the
pragmatic "rational nexus" constitutional standard.
D. FLORIDA WATER AND SEWER CONNECTION FEES
The next most common form of exaction after mandatory dedication
requirements are user fees and connection fees. In Florida, the 1976
landmark case of Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v.
City ofDunedin,27 upholding water and sewer connection fees, formed
the current basis for the widespread application of impact fees for all
types of public facilities and services. The Florida Supreme Court re-
jected the argument that the connection charges were an illegal tax on
23. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 IM. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976) (condition
to rezoning approval).
24. Village of Orland Park v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 135
Ill. App. 3d 520, 481 N.E.2d 946 (1985) (pursuant to a preannexation agreement).
25. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966).
26. Id. at 6, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
27. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 876 (1979).
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newcomers. As in most states, the issue was whether or not local gov-
ernments had the power to condition development approval on the
payment of fees for the necessary expansion of the public capital facili-
ties. After the Dunedin court resolved this issue, the issue of how fees
should be calculated without risking invalidation on constitutional
grounds became popular in state courts. By 1983, the Florida courts
had established fairly definite standards to determine which fees would
meet the "rational nexus" test for constitutionally valid development
fees in the cases of Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County28 and Home
Builders and Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Board of
County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County.2 9 These cases have largely
dictated the form and substance of "second generation" impact fee or-
dinances in Florida and in other states.
B. Impact Fees Properly Defined
Local governments are empowered, in" varying degrees, to regulate
land use and to provide adequate public facilities to serve new growth.
To meet the substantial cost of providing new roads, schools and other
public facilities to serve new growth, local governments have required
developers to contribute public facilities or pay a proportionate cost of
those facilities to offset the impact of proposed developments on capital
facilities. "Exactions" or "developer exactions" are nothing more than
conditions to development approval. Exactions may take the form of:
(1) mandatory dedications of land for roads, schools or parks, as a con-
dition to plat approval, (2) fees-in-lieu of mandatory dedication, (3)
water or sewer connection fees and (4) impact fees.
Nevertheless, a great deal of confusion still exists about how impact
fees differ from other types of exactions and what limitations apply to
their use. For example, the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commis-
sion (NIPC) recently conducted a survey on the use and types of im-
pact fees by 109 local governments in northeastern Illinois.3 ° Using a
definition of "impact fees" provided in the survey instructions,31 the
28. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding local regulations requiring
land dedication or fees in lieu for expansion of county-wide park system).
29. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding Palm Beach County's
"Fair Share Contribution for Road Improvements" Ordinance).
30. NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING COMMISSION, To FEE OR NOT To FEE?,
REGIONWIDE DEVELOPMENT FEE SURVEY: INrrIAL FINDINGS REPORT (July 24,
1989).
31. Respondents were given the following general definition of impact fees: "Impact
1990]
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survey asked respondents whether their local government is currently
using an impact fee system.
The survey results indicate misperceptions about the meaning of the
term "impact fee." Forty-two percent of the local governments who
reported using impact fees were not actually administering impact fees,
as the term was defined in the survey. Conversely, twenty percent of
the governments who said that they did not utilize impact fees were
actually doing so, according to the survey definition.32
Before the legal requirements applicable to impact fees, as distin-
guished from other types of development fees, can be meaningfully dis-
cussed, a uniform, consistent definition must be established.
An "IMPACT FEE" is a type of exaction which is:
* in the form of a predetermined money payment;
* assessed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit, an
occupancy permit or plat approval;
* pursuant to local government powers to regulate new growth
and development and provide for adequate public facilities and
services;
* levied to fund large-scale, off-site public facilities and services
necessary to serve new development;
* in an amount which is proportionate to the need for the public
facilities generated by new development.
Simply put, impact fees are designed to require that each develop-
ment pays its proportionate share of the cost of providing the off-site
public services and facilities required by new development. 3  The key
definitional elements described above distinguish impact fees in one or
more respects from taxes, special assessments and other types of exac-
tions, such as fees-in-lieu of mandatory dedication, connection fees and
user fees.
1. Impact Fees Distinguished from Taxes
A common legal attack against impact fees is that they constitute
taxes imposed in violation of the constitutional requirement that taxes
fees are charges levied on new development in order to generate revenue for funding
capital improvement necessitated by such new development." Id.
32. Uncertainty regarding the legality of impact fees was also apparent from the
survey results. Only 18 percent of the respondents believed that Illinois' existing en-
abling legislation was adequate. Id.




on real property be levied uniformly.3 4 However, if properly defined,
impact fees are distinguishable from taxes. Each is authorized under
different delegated powers of local government and is subject to differ-
ent constitutional requirements.
In general, a local government's authority to impose regulatory fees
is derived from the state's police power to regulate businesses or activi-
ties for the public's health, safety or general welfare, while the more
restricted taxing power is exercised only to raise general revenue.35 An
Illinois example illustrates this legal proposition.
In 1961, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
sewer service connection charges constituted illegal taxes in violation
of the uniformity of taxation requirements of the Illinois Constitu-
tion.3 6 People ex rel County of Du Page v. Smith" involved a challenge
to a statute enacted to alleviate the stresses new development and rapid
population growth placed on suburban sewer facilities. The statute au-
thorized the five "collar" counties surrounding Cook County to impose
charges for connections made to their sewer systems. In rejecting the
claim that these charges violated the constitutional requirement that
taxes be uniform, the court explained that:
there is a clear cut and definite distinction between the legal con-
ception of such charges and taxes. Taxes are an enforced propor-
tional contribution levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty
for support of the government. Service charges, tolls, water rates
and the like are, on the other hand, contractual in nature, either
express or implied, and are compensation for the use of another's
property, or of an improvement made by another, and their
amount is determined by the cost of the property or improvement
and the consideration of the return which such an expenditure
should yield.3"
34. For example, uniformity of taxation is required under the Illinois and Florida
state constitutions. See ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a) and FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
35. See Bauman & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of
American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 54 (1987).
36. The Illinois Constitution requires that:
Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be
levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by
law.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 4(8).
37. 21 Ill. 2d 572, 173 N.E.2d 485 (1961).
38. Id. at 578, 173 N.E.2d 491-92 (citations omitted).
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In a more recent case, the Illinois Supreme Court restated the differ-
ences between "fees" and "taxes":
A fee is defined as "a charge fixed by law for services of public
officers," and is regarded as compensation for the services ren-
dered.... On the other hand, a charge having no relation to the
services rendered, assessed to provide general revenue rather than
compensation, is a tax.39
In other cases, the Illinois Supreme Court also established that the au-
thority for development exactions is the police power, and not local
governments' powers of taxation or eminent domain.4°
Other jurisdictions have also sustained impact fees and other types of
fees imposed as a condition of development approval as valid police
power regulations.4 Thus, if impact fee legislation ties the fee imposed
to the benefit received, the constitutional requirements relevant to the
levy and assessment of real property taxes will be found inapplicable.
39. Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444, 452, 459 N.E.2d 1346, 1349-50 (1984) (cita-
tions omitted) (finding filing fee imposed on petitioners for dissolution of marriage for
use in general welfare program was an illegal tax). See also Emerson College v. City of
Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098 (1984) (discussing the distinguishing traits of
fees as opposed to taxes).
40. See Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956) (up-
holding a subdivision ordinance requirement that developers install curb and gutter im-
provements as a condition to plat approval). See also Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 68
Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (upholding mandatory dedication of land, or fees in
lieu of land, for school and park purposes as a condition of plat approval).
41. See Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco, 750 P.2d 324,
244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988) (upholding San Francisco Transit Impact Development Fee
Ordinance); Home Builders and Contractors Ass'n of Palm Beach County, Inc. v.
Board of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (upholding road impact fee); Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunnedin,
329 So. 2d 314, 317-20 (Fla. 1976), cert denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979) (impact fee a
regulation, if proper limitations placed on amounts collected); Call v. City of West Jor-
dan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (in-lieu-fee for flood control, park and recreational pur-
poses upheld); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965) (in-lieu-fees
for school, park, and recreational purposes upheld as reasonable police power regula-
tion); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1966) (in-lieu-fee for recreational purposes held valid under the police power);
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964) (fee in lieu
of dedication is a regulation which is valid under the police power); see also Nolan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (indicating that an exaction placed
on development as a condition of approval is constitutional where the exaction substan-
tially advances a legitimate public interest). But see Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc.
v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 570 A.2d 850 (Md. 1990) (invalidating road impact
fee as an improper tax for general revenue purposes).
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2. Impact Fees Distinguished from Special Assessments
Impact fees are also sometimes confused with special assessments or
special benefit taxes. The primary difference is that special assessments
represent a measure of the benefit of public improvements on new or
existing development, whereas impact fees typically measure the cost of
the demand or need for public facilities as a result of new development
only.42
3. Impact Fees Distinguished from Fees in Lieu of Land
Dedication
Local governments may impose fees in lieu of dedication as a condi-
tion of development approval where land may not be sufficient to meet
the local governments' need for off-site facilities. The fee-in-lieu allows
local governments to pool fees from various subdivisions to finance
necessary facilities such as off-site schools and parks in the event that
the dedication of on-site land or facilities is impractical because of the
limitations of the site.43 It is important to note that fees received in
lieu of dedication may only fund these facilities for which on-site dedi-
cation may be required under local subdivision authority.' Thus, the
types of facilites which can be funded in this manner are more limited
than those funded through impact fees.
The method of assessment of impact fees also makes impact fees dis-
42. Compare Montgomery County v. Schultze, 302 Md. 481, 489 A.2d 16 (1985)
(invalidating special assessment that failed to reflect a reasonable relationship between
the actual benefit to the assessed property and the amount of the assessment) with Pio-
neer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961) (establishing requirement that subdivision exactions be "specifically and
uniquely attributable" to the development activity in question). See also Smith, From
Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage
Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 5, 19-24 (1987) (regarding the reintroduction of special assessments as an alter-
native to impact fees in some states).
43. See, eg., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685 (1981) (upholding mandatory dedication of land or fees in lieu to local school
district as precondition to issuance of building permit); Krughoff v. City of Naperville,
68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (upholding requirement of dedication of land or
fees in lieu of land, for school and park purposes); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18
N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (upholding fees in lieu of dedica-
tion of parkland); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442 (1966) (upholding fees in lieu of dedication of land for schools or parks).
44. See Conners & High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions: From Dedication to
Linkage, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 69, 71-72 (1987).
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tinguishable from fees in lieu of dedication. Whereas the amount of
land or in-lieu fees exacted as a condition to subdivision approval usu-
ally depends on the total acreage and projected "build out" of an entire
subdivision or phase of a subdivision, impact fees are commonly im-
posed on a "per unit" basis, depending on the number of bedrooms or
square footage of a unit. In this regard, impact fees are more flexible
than mandatory "on-site" dedications of roads or park land because
they do not require developers to pay "up-front" large costs for an
entire subdivision or planned development. Instead, they only charge
the developer for the proportionate impacts of new development on
public services and facilities in terms of units actually constructed.
4. Impact Fees Distinguished from Connection Fees
Connection fees, "tap-in" fees or "user" fees have become an impor-
tant source of funding in some states for the expansion of water and
sewer facilities.45 Although theoretically akin to water and sewer con-
nection fees, impact fees are distinguishable in the scope of public im-
provements which they fund and in the statutory basis for their
assessment. Many state statutes expressly authorize connection fees.46
Further, impact fees, however, are not limited to water and sewer facil-
ities. Subject to the limitations of a particular jurisdiction, impact fees
generally may be used to provide any public facilities which can rea-
sonably be construed to fall within state enabling legislation and home
rule powers.
C. First and Second Generation Impact Fees
The first generation of true impact fees, mostly those adopted in the
1970s, were simpler than current impact fees. Most were adopted
without enabling legislation, guidelines or standards. Fees were im-
posed in a climate of hot real estate markets, development booms and
an immediate need for public facilities to serve new development. In
short, there was no time to argue the fairness of impact fees in court.
Now that real estate markets have cooled in many parts of the coun-
45. See, ag., Contractors and Builders Ass'n of v. City of Dunnedin, 329 So. 2d 314
(Fla. 1976) (upholding fees for connection to water and sewer system); People Ex rel
County of Du Page v. Smith, 21111. 2d 572, 173 N.E. 2d 485 (1961) (upholding sewer
connection fees).
46. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66483 (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN., § 180.13(2)
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 42, § 306 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1989) ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24., § 11-150-1; OHIO CONsT. art. XVIII, § 4.
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try and courts and legislatures have had a decade of debate over the
appropriateness of broad, discretionary impact fee ordinances, the sec-
ond generation of impact fee ordinances has emerged. These ordi-
nances are enacted under enabling statutes or are designed to reflect
the principles of well-established case law. Fee amounts are calculated
using more complex formulas and computer models, and often are ad-
ministered by engineers rather than planners. Second generation im-
pact fee statutes and ordinances also contain more specific substantive
and procedural standards and attempt to address questions of reasona-
bleness and equity.
D. Authority to Impose Impact Fees
One of the most important criteria in determining whether or not
impact fees are legally feasible in a given locale is whether or not there
is any existing authority to impose them. The adoption of enabling leg-
islation, if necessary, can require months and often years of lobbying
and consensus building. Part II, which follows, explains the various
sources of authority under which impact fees may be adopted, and doc-
uments the national trend toward adoption of state impact fee enabling
legislation.
II. "SECOND GENERATION" IMPACT FEES
A. Elements of Second Generation Impact Fees
Early impact fees were often confused with taxes, special assess-
ments, connection fees and other types of fees. This was understanda-
ble, given that there was neither state enabling legislation nor any
concrete case law to distinguish them from other capital facilities fi-
nancing tools. At first, impact fees were viewed as unauthorized, ille-
gal extortion. The idea of raising funds for capital facilities financing
through "land use regulations" rather than bond referenda was revolu-
tionary. Developers naturally revolted, compelling courts and legisla-
tures to define the elements and standards of what is increasingly
referred to as "second generation" impact fees.
The drafters of "second generation" impact fee legislation have at-
tempted to learn from their predecessors' mistakes. In general, second
generation impact fees are distinguishable from first generation impact
fees by the following elements:
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1. Statutory Basis
Impact fee legislation has become more widespread, indicating the
efforts of many jurisdictions to ensure that there is clear legal authority
for impact fees and indicating the increased political acceptance of im-
pact fees as a means to address capital facility requirements.
2. Methodology
Data and staffing requirements for second generation impact fees are
significant. Unlike early fees-in-lieu of dedication requirements, based
simply on a fixed cash payment per acre,47 and first generation impact
fees, second generation impact fees use complex formulas and com-
puter models, incorporating population and employment projections,
trip generation data and capital facilities cost estimates.48
3. Procedures
Second generation impact fees are usually subject to detailed and
rigorous notice and hearing requirements, not only for the ordinance
itself but also for the capital improvements plans and land use assump-
tions which justify the impact fee ordinance.49 Especially in states with
newly-adopted impact fee legislation, these heightened procedural re-
quirements reflect a legislative intent to provide uniform, statewide
standards and procedures for impact fees and limit the potential for
local abuse of discretion.
4. Scope of Facilities Funded
Though most impact fee ordinances are still designed to fund one or
more of the traditional types of capital improvements (e.g., roads,
parks, schools), modem impact fees may fund a broader array of capi-
47. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (upholding ordinance requiring dedica-
tion of land for public school, park and recreation sites or pay a fee of $200 per residen-
tial lot created by the proposed subdivision).
48. See generally, NICHOLAS, THE CALCULATION OF PROPORTIONATE-SHARE IM-
PACT FEES, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT No. 408 (1988).
49. See TEXAS GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.041-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (requiring
separate notice and public hearings to consider the ordinance adopting the "land use
assumptions within the designated service area that will be used to develop the capital
improvements plan," and the ordinance adopting a capital improvements plan and im-
posing an impact fee).
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tal improvements, such as government buildings, libraries and public
services like police, fire and emergency medical services.
5. Exemptions
Early impact fees usually applied to all new development, or a broad
category of new development, such as new residential or of-
fice/commercial development. For equitable reasons, some second
generation impact fees exempt a narrow class of land uses, such as af-
fordable housing or non-profit organizations, in order to avoid the
harsh impact of development fees on less-profitable, socially beneficial
land uses.
B. New Impact Fee Legislation
Local governments in various states have asserted the right to assess
impact fees under two major sources of authority: express enabling
legislation and broad home rule authority to regulate new growth and
development.
One of the major forces shaping modern impact fee ordinances is
new state legislation. To date, several of states have enacted impact fee
legislation,50 and within these states, the legislation is usually limited in
its application to certain specified jurisdictions51 or specific types of
public improvements. 52 However, proposed impact fee legislation has
50. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (1990) (development fees for "nec-
essary public services"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West 1983) (park and recreational
fees), § 65970 (school facilities fees), § 66483 (drainage and sewer facilities), § 66484
(roads and bridges) and § 66484.5 (groundwater recharge fees); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3202(3) (encouraging the use of "innovative land development regulations" im-
pact fees); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-71-1 to -13 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (development impact
fees for 7 categories of public facilities); Ill. Act of July 26, 1989, P.A. 86-97, §§ 5-901 to
5-918, 1990 Ill. Legis, Serv. 968-77 (West) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121,§ 5-901 to 5-918) (road improvement impact fees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A,§ 4354 (1989); TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1269 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990)
(comprehensive capital improvements impact fee statute); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 5200-5206 (1975 & Supp. 1989) ("capital projects" impact fees); VA. CODE ANN.§§ 15.1-498.1 to -498.10 (1989) (road impact fees).
51. See, e.g., Illinois Road Improvement Fee Law, infra notes 58-79 (applicable
only to counties with a population exceeding 400,000 and home rule municipalities);
VA. CODE ANN., § 15.1-498.1 to .10 (1989) (fee applicable only to counties having a
population of 500,000 or more, and adjacent counties and municipalities).
52. See, eg., Act of July 26, 1989, P.A. 86-97, § 5-901 to 5-918, 1990 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 968-77 (West) (to be codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-901 to 5-918)
(applicable only to "road improvements").
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been or is under consideration in a number of states"3 and has the po-
tential of becoming law within the next two or three years.
The limited scope of most statutes leaves those subdivisions of local
government not covered by the new impact fee legislation wondering
whether they are precluded from adopting impact fees or have some
other authority on which to rely. The last section of this part of the
Article describes potential non-legislative sources of authority for these
local governments to adopt impact fees.
1. Arizona Development Fees
Arizona has the oldest impact fee legislation in the country.
Adopted in 1982, the legislation authorizes any municipality to assess
"development fees" to "offset costs to the municipality associated with
providing necessary public services to a development." '14 The legisla-
tion imposes only a few, general limitations, namely:
1. Development fees must result in a beneficial use to the
development;
2. Collected fees must be placed in a separate fund and may only
be used for the purposes stated in the legislation (there are
none stated besides the general purpose of offsetting costs to
the municipality);
3. Fee schedules must be provided by the municipality; residen-
tial developers are required to pay when construction permits
are issued;
4. The amount of the fee must bear a "reasonable relationship"
to the burden imposed upon the municipality to provide addi-
tional necessary public services to the development;
5. Fees must be assessed in a non-discriminatory manner;
6. Fees must take into account all public infrastructure provided
by a community facilities district, established under separate
legislation; and
7. Notice and a public hearing must be conducted prior to the
scheduled date of adoption of the new or increased impact
fee. 5
No definition of "public services" or any other term is provided.
This legislation, like the first Illinois Transportation Impact Fee legis-
53. Arizona HB 2648 (impact fee bill, defeated in 1989 legislative session); Dela-
ware HB 475, 135th Gen. Ass., 1989 (transportation impact fee bill expected to be in-
troduced in January 1990).
54. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05 (1982).
55. Id., § 9-463.05(C).
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lation,56 confers broad discretion to local officials to determine the
amount of fees, what types of facilities are funded and who should pay
the fees.
2. California Development Fees
Rather than adopting a single, comprehensive impact fee statute,
California has adopted separate development fee statutes over the past
decade for a variety of public facilities, including park and recreation
facilities fees, school facilities fees, drainage and sewer facilities fees,
and groundwater recharge fees.57
The widespread use of this variety of development fees in California
has no doubt been attributable to limitations on other, more traditional
sources of capital facilities financing by Proposition 13 and other tax-
payer initiatives.
3. Illinois Road Improvement Impact Fees
Illinois provides a classic case study in the evolution of impact fees.
In the 1960s, Illinois was a state with no home rule delegation of pow-
ers to local governments, no state impact fee legislation and a cautious
judiciary. After a 1970 constitutional amendment, home rule units of
local government began imposing developer exactions for broad ranges
of public facilities. Not until 1987 did the Illinois General Assembly
adopt Transportation Impact Fee legislation.
After the 1987 impact fee legislation was adopted, fiscal life was
made easier for only a few local governments, which were given broad
discretion to design and adopt transportation impact fees under the
legislation. Following the Texas example, the Illinois legislature
adopted new legislation in 1989 that was much longer and more de-
tailed than the predecessor. Though the new legislation attempts to
prescribe a formula for constitutionally valid impact fees, it raises two
new questions: 1) whether interpretation and implementation of an ex-
tensive, more complex statute is worth the trouble for those that are
empowered to act under its authority; and 2) whether local govern-
ments that are not covered under the new legislation are preempted
56. Formerly ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 608 (1980 & Supp. 1989) (repealed
effective July 27, 1989, by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-901 to 5-918).
57. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West 1983) (park and recreational fees), § 65970
(school facilities fees), § 66483 (drainage and sewer facilities), § 66484 (roads and
bridges), § 66484.5 (groundwater recharge fees).
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from adopting impact fees under other sources of authority for other
types of public improvements.
What follows is a detailed case study of the history and evolution of
the Illinois road impact fee legislation, illustrating how states are be-ginning to make the transition from "first generation" to "second gen-
eration" impact fees. The Illinois experience also illustrates the
convergence of disparate state court tests for determining the constitu-
tional validity of impact fees. While first generation impact fees were
commonly judged by one of three different standards (the "rational ba-
sis" test, the "rational nexus" test, or the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test), the "rational nexus" test is emerging as the most
frequently used test for judging the constitutional validity of more
complex "second generation" impact fees.
A. HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS ROAD IMPACT FEE LAW
The Illinois legislature originally approved transportation impact fee
legislation in 1987,58 largely in response to new development and in-
creasing traffic congestion in the collar counties surrounding Chicago.
As originally enacted, the legislation was applicable only to larger
counties with a population of over 400,000 but less than 1,000,000."
The legislation authorized these counties to establish transportation
impact districts and collect transportation impact fees from new devel-
opments that would require direct or indirect access to the state or
county highway system. The county was empowered to establish the
fee amounts, by ordinance, based on the amount of estimated traffic
generated by various land uses and the amount of improvements
needed to maintain a reasonable level of service on the existing and
proposed highway systems. The legislation also established other re-
strictions regarding the timing and use of fees.
Toward the end of the 1989 legislative session, the Illinois General
Assembly repealed the 1987 transportation impact fee legislation,
largely in response to the concerns of both developers and local gov-
58. House Bill 1672, Public Act 85-464, added to the Illinois Highway Code a new
paragraph authorizing the creation of transportation impact districts. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 121, para. 5-608 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1989). For a history and background on
this legislation, see Larsen & Zimet, Impact Fees: Et Tu, Illinois?, 21 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 489 (1988).
59. These population parameters effectively limited the applicability of the legisla-
tion to the two most populous counties bordering on Cook County and the City of
Chicago: Du Page County and Lake County.
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ernments that the legislation gave unfettered discretion to a select few
local governments. The resulting new road improvement impact fee
legislation contains more explicit standards and procedures.'
As with the original Illinois Transportation Impact Fee legislation,
the "second generation" legislation authorizes road improvement im-
pact fees only. However, it expands the 1987 legislation by expressly
recognizing home rule authority to adopt impact fees, subject, of
course, to constitutional limits.6 The 1987 legislation applied only to
counties with a population between 400,000 and 1,000,0000 while the
1989 legislation eliminated the 1,000,000 population cap, thereby con-
firming the authority of Cook County, the only home rule county to
adopt road impact fees. Because General Assembly members deter-
mined that home rule municipalities were authorized to adopt road
impact fees pursuant to their home rule powers even though not ex-
pressly authorized under the original legislation, the legislators added
these units of local government to the list of governmental units ex-
pressly authorized to adopt road improvement impact fee ordinances.62
In addition, the 1989 legislation expanded state control over local
governments in the area of impact fees by adding minimum standards
with which local impact fee ordinances and resolutions must comply.
The legislation prohibits the levy of road impact fees by a unit of local
government6' if another unit is already assessing fees for the same
60. Du Page County, the only county to adopt a transportation fee ordinance pur-
suant to the 1987 legislation, is now defending lawsuits filed by the Northern Illinois
Home Builders Association and the Home Builders Association of Chicago, challenging
the validity of the impact fee enabling legislation and the county's ordinance.
61. The transcript of the House of Representatives debate on June 30th, 1989, im-
mediately preceding the vote to adopt the new legislation included the following ex-
change between Representative Stern and Representative Keane:
Rep. Stern: "Does the [Road Improvement Impact Fee] Act expand the authoriza-
tion or scope of the original impact fee statute?"
Rep Keane: "No, the intention was to limit the authorizatiorpfor the imposition of
impact fees to roadway impact fees and to jurisdictions that had the authority to
impose impact fees under the original impact fee statute."
State of Illinois, 86th General Assembly, House of Representatives Debate Transcrip-
tion, June 20, 1989.
62. See supra note 61. It was noted later in the House debate that the City of Na-
pervile, a home rule municipality that had enacted a transportation impact fee ordi-
nance under its home rule powers, would have continued authority under the new
legislation to assess these fees, provided that the fees were brought into compliance with
the new legislation within 12 months from the effective date of the new legislation [July
26, 1989].
63. Section 5-903 of the new legislation defines "units of local government" as
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roads." Beyond the scope of the new legislation, other sources of au-
thority provide a less defined and therefore uncertain legal basis for the
adoption of impact fees for other types of impact fees. (See Part II.C.,
Other Sources of Authority, below).
B. DEFINITIONS
"First generation" impact fee legislation and ordinances rarely pro-
vided definitions. The 1987 Illinois legislation did not define the types
of "improvements" for which transportation impact fees could be col-
lected. By contrast, the 1989 legislation specifically defines "road im-
provements" as the construction or expansion of local roads, streets,
highways, bridges, rights-of-way and traffic control improvements (as
well as state-owned ramps, tollway ramps, streets or highways, subject
to intergovernmental agreement). The definition does not include the
"soft costs" to plan and design the improvements, although these costs
are authorized as a proper use of impact fees under a different section
of the legislation.65 The new legislation defines a "new development"
as
any residential, commercial, industrial or other project which is
being newly constructed, reconstructed, redeveloped, structurally
altered, relocated, or enlarged, and which generates additional
traffic within the service area or areas of the unit of local
government. 66
The new legislation also attempts to clarify some of the existing am-
biguities associated with the constitutional requirement developed by
the Illinois courts that various types of developer exactions be "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" to the "proportionate share" of the
need for new public facilities created by a proposed development. Un-
fortunately, the definitions of these same terms in the legislation create
more questions than they answer. The definitions of the terms "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" and "proportionate share" are as
follows:
"Specifically and uniquely attributable" means that a new devel-
opment creates the need, or an identifiable portion of the need, for
additional capacity to be provided by a road improvement. Each
"counties with a population over 400,000 and all home rule municipalities." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-903.
64. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-911.
65. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-904.
66. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-903.
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new development paying impact fees used to fund a road improve-
ment must receive a direct and material benefit from the road im-
provement constructed with the impact fees paid. The need for
road improvements funded by impact fees shall be based upon
generally accepted traffic engineering practices as assignable to the
new development paying the fees.
"Proportionate share" means the cost of road improvements that
are specifically and uniquely attributable to a new development
after consideration of the following factors: the amount of addi-
tional traffic generated by the new development, any appropriate
credit or offset for contribution of money, dedication of land, con-
struction of road improvements or traffic reduction techniques,
payments reasonably anticipated to be made by or as a result of a
new development in the form of user fees, debt service payments,
or taxes which are dedicated for road improvements and all other
available sources of funding road improvements.
67
The definition of "specifically and uniquely attributable" attempts to
clarify an issue yet to be addressed by the Illinois courts-namely,
whether impact fees may be validly imposed for public road improve-
ments when more than one new development is responsible for creating
the need for those improvements. The new legislation answers this is-
sue affirmatively, providing for fees attributable to "an identifiable por-
tion of the need" for road improvements. This language effectively
refutes any argument that road impact fees adopted pursuant to the
state legislation may only be valid when a new development is the "sole
cause" of the need for such public improvements.6 8 The need for capi-
tal facilities may be caused by more than one new development, each of
which would be required to contribute its proportionate share of the
total cost of the road improvements necessitated by the development.
The definition of "specifically and uniquely attributable" includes
the requirement that "[e]ach new development paying impact fees used
to fund a road improvement must receive a direct and material benefit
from the road improvement constructed with the impact fees paid."
67. Id.
68. The issue which some state courts and legal commentators have raised is
whether impact fees or other types of development exactions may only be validly im-
posed when a particular development is the "sole cause" of the need for the new public
facilities, or whether fees may be assessed against multiple developments contributing
cumulatively to the need for new facilities, provided that the amount of the fee is within
constitutional bounds of reasonableness. See Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d
608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1966); infra note 188-95 and accompanying text.
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Although the definition does not explain what types of impact fees
would confer some "direct and material benefit" to the new develop-
ment paying the fee, the possibility of fees for "off-site" improvements
is supported by the definition of "road improvements" for which fees
may be expended. "Road improvements" are not limited to improve-
ments on the site of a new development subject to the fee, but rather
may include improvements to any roads, streets or highways under the
jurisdiction of the local government.
The definition of "proportionate share" requires adjustments to the
formula which local governments typically use as the basis for their fee
schedules. These adjustments no doubt were intended to avoid the
"double taxation" trap. These definitions are repeated, in somewhat
different form, in a later section of the legislation relating to impact fee
ordinance requirements.69
The legislation identifies eight specific factors which must be consid-
ered by the local government unit in determining the proportionate
share of the cost of road improvements to be paid by the developer.
These are:
(1) the cost of existing roads within the service area,
(2) the financing sources used to cure existing road deficiencies,
(3) the extent to which the new development required to pay the
fee has contributed, in prior years, to the cost of road im-
provements through taxation, assessments, or developer
contributions,
(4) the extent to which the new development will be required to
contribute to the cost of road improvements in the future,
(5) the extent to which new development should be credited for
providing road improvements to other properties within the
service area,
(6) extraordinary costs incurred in servicing a particular
development,
(7) consideration of the time and price differential inherent in a
fair comparison of fees paid at different times, and
(8) the availability of other sources of funding road improve-
ments, including, but not limited to, user charges, general tax
levies, intergovernmental transfers and special taxation or
assessments.
The obvious intent of the legislature in requiring consideration of
these factors is to guard against arbitrary or unreasonable impact fees.
However, the meaning and relevance of some of the factors to the con-
69. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-906.
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stitutional "proportionate share" test for valid impact fees is unclear.
For example, what are "existing road deficiencies" mentioned in factor
number two? What is the relevance of "the extent to which the new
development required to pay the fee has contributed, in prior years, to
the cost of road improvements through taxation, assessments or devel-
oper contributions"? To what extent must these factors be considered,
and what findings would justify the levy of impact fees? Rather than
taming the beast called "unfettered local discretion," the legislature
may have created, in the new road impact fee legislation, the same
beast but with different spots.
C. STANDARDS
Unlike the original transportation impact fee legislation, the new
road improvement impact fee legislation contains extensive substantive
and procedural standards. Substantively, the new legislation autho-
rizes a unit of local government to impose impact fees for new develop-
ment within designated "service areas"70 only in accordance with
certain specified requirements,71 including:
1. An impact fee payable by a developer shall not exceed a pro-
portionate share of costs incurred by a unit of local government
which are specifically and uniquely attributable to the new devel-
opment paying the fee in providing road improvements, but...
2. [The fee] may be used to cover costs associated with the sur-
veying of the service area, with the acquisition of land and rights-
of-way, with engineering and planning costs, and with all other
costs which are directly related to the improvement, expansion,
enlargement or construction of roads, streets or highways within
the service area or areas as designated in the comprehensive road
improvement plan.
3. An impact fee shall not be imposed to cover costs associated
with the repair, reconstruction, operation or maintenance of ex-
isting roads, streets or highways, nor shall an impact fee be used to
cure existing deficiencies or to upgrade, update, expand or replace
existing roads in order to meet stricter safety or environmental
requirements; provided, however, that...
4. Such fees may be used in conjunction with other funds avail-
able to the unit of local government for the purpose of curing ex-
isting deficiencies, but...
5. In no event shall the amount of impact fees expended exceed
70. Compare "transportation impact districts" in the existing legislation.
71. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para 5-904 (emphasis added).
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the development's proportionate share of the cost of such road
improvements. And,
6. [n]othing in this Section shall preclude a unit of local govern-
ment from providing credits to the developer for services, convey-
ances, improvements or cash if provided by agreement.
Each of these requirements relates to, and incorporates, constitu-
tional "reasonableness" requirements for valid impact fees as these re-
quirements have been developed by courts in Illinois and other states.
The reference to fees that represent a "proportionate share of costs"
and that are "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the new devel-
opment paying the fee are direct reflections of the constitutional test
developed by the Illinois Supreme Court for valid subdivision
exactions.
The use of impact fees is also limited under the new legislation to
road improvements within the service area or areas as specified in the
comprehensive road improvement plan, which must be updated at least
every five years.72
Procedurally, the 1989 legislation illustrates the trend in state dis-
trust of local government discretion in the adoption of impact fees.73
The 1987 legislation gave qualified counties broad discretion "to estab-
lish transportation districts," "collect transportation impact fees" and
"adopt reasonable rules and regulations to administer and enforce" the
impact fee legislation. The 1989 legislation requires units of local gov-
ernment to give notice and conduct a public hearing, prior to the adop-
tion of an impact fee ordinance or resolution, "to consider land use
assumptions74 that will be used to develop the comprehensive road im-
provement plan."75 Potentially the most significant of the new proce-
72. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-914 and 5-915.
73. Cf Texas impact fee legislation, infra note 81, containing similar extensive pro-
cedural requirements.
74. The definitions section, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 9-903, defines "land use
assumptions" as follows:
"LAND USE ASSUMPTIONS" means a description of the service area or areas and the
roads, streets or highways incorporated therein, including projections relating to
changes in land uses, densities and population growth rates which affect the level of
traffic within the service area or areas over a 10 year period of time. "SERVICE
AREA" means one or more land areas within the boundaries of the unit of local
government which has been designated by the unit of local government in the com-
prehensive road improvement plan.
75. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-905(b). The required elements of the
Comprehensive Road Improvements Plan are set out in para. 5-910.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol38/iss1/4
IMPACT FEES
dural requirements is the directive to create a local Advisory
Committee comprised of representatives of the real estate, develop-
ment, building and labor industries, as well as the local government.7 6
The committee is responsible for reviewing the "land use assump-
tions," which form the basis of an impact fee ordinance, and recom-
mending, within thirty days after the public hearing has been held, the
adoption, rejection or modification of the assumptions.
Once an ordinance or resolution approving the land use assumption
has been approved, the local government unit must prepare a compre-
hensive road improvement plan77 and hold another public hearing to
consider the proposed plan and the imposition of impact fees related to
the plan. After the Advisory Committee reviews the plan and makes a
recommendation, the unit of local government may adopt, by ordi-
nance or resolution, the proposed plan and impact fees, subject to the
required standards, described above.
Any person aggrieved by payment of an impact fee may appeal to
the local legislative body in accordance with the procedures included in
the impact fee ordinance or resolution. 78
D. GRANDFATHERING OF RECENTLY APPROVED DEVELOPMENT
The 1989 Road Improvement Impact Fee legislation specifically
exempts:
any new development for which site specific development ap-
proval has been given by a unit of local government within 18
76. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-907. Note, however, that units of local gov-
ernment have the option of treating the Plan Commission as the Advisory Committee
and appointing additional members, for the limited purpose of dealing with impact fees,
in order to meet the statutory requirement that at least forty percent of the Committee
members be representatives of the real estate, development, building and private labor
industries.
77. According to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-910, the comprehensive road
improvement plan must be developed by qualified professionals familiar with generally
accepted engineering and planning practices. The plan must contain a description of all
existing roads with their existing deficiencies and all proposed roads with a schedule for
construction. In addition, para. 5-914 provides that fees collected shall only be used for
those road improvements specified in the plan in the same manner as motor fuel tax
monies. Para. 5-915 requires updates of the plan every 5 years.
78. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-917. This section grants standing to any per-
sons paying fees to appeal almost anything done under an impact fee ordinance in ac-
cordance with provisions set out in the ordinance itself. Appeals would initially go to
the governing body of the municipality or county, but then to a court in a de novo
proceeding.
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months before the first date of publication by the unit of local gov-
ernent of a notice of public hearing to consider [the background
issues related to the adoption of impact fees]. 79
4. Texas Capital Improvements Impact Fees
In June 1987, only a few months before Illinois adopted its original
transporation impact fee legislation, the Texas General Assembly ap-
proved the nation's first comprehensive impact fee legislation, which
has since served as a model for impact fee legislation in at least one
other state.80 Entitled "Impact fees for capital improvements or facil-
ity expansions,"81 the legislation empowers any "political subdivision"
of the state to adopt impact fees for capital improvements or facility
expansions. "Capital facilities" are defined as water supply facilities,
wastewater facilities, stormwater, drainage and flood control facilities,
or roadway facilities, with a life expectancy of three or more years,
owned and operated by or on behalf of a political subdivision.
The legislation contains detailed definitions, applicability standards,
procedures for adoption, notice requirements, limitations on the use of
proceeds, refund provisions, capital plan improvement update require-
ments, requirements that the political subdivision establish an advisory
committee composed of, among others, representatives of the real es-
tate development and building industries; and general provisions. In
contrast to the broad Arizona development fee legislation, described in
Section B. I., above, which authorizes the adoption of impact fees for
any public services in only a single page, the Texas legislation autho-
rizes the adoption of impact fees for a defined list of capital improve-
ments in a detailed ten-page statute.
The recently adopted Illinois road impact fee legislation contains
many of the same requirements as the Texas legislation, using the exact
terminology of the Texas legislation. For example, both require the
adoption of "land use assumptions" as a prerequisite to adoption of an
impact fee ordinance and both prescribe extensive procedural require-
79. ILL. ArNN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-903 (definition of "new development"). In
addition, the new law requires that these exempt developments obtain a building permit
within 18 months after the date that the notice of the public hearing is published.
80. See Illinois' Road Improvement Impact Fee legislation, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121, para. 5-901 to 5-918, and proposed comprehensive Georgia development impact fee
legislation, original Georgia H.B. 796, introduced at the beginning of the January 1990
legislative session but replaced by a shorter Substitute H.B. 796, enacted supra note 50.
81. TExAs LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.041-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (part of
title 28 governing Cities, Towns and Villages).
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ments, including the establishment of an "advisory committee" com-
posed of some of representatives of the same industries. The Georgia
legislature considered the Texas scheme but opted for a shorter, proce-
durally simpler impact fee bill.
5. Tennessee Cooperative Public Facilities Financing Act
The Tennessee Cooperative Public Facilities Financing Act,82 ap-
plies only to counties having a metropolitan form of government and
having a 1980 population of more than 450,000, effectively limiting its
applicability to the Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson
County. As with the Illinois legislation, the population parameters are
designed to ensure that the impact fee legislation applies only to rela-
tively large local governments that have experienced rapid growth and,
presumably, are expected to continue their growth.
The Tennessee legislation falls somewhere between the broad Texas
legislation and the relatively narrow Illinois legislation in terms of the
scope of facilities that may be funded. Although the Tennessee legisla-
tion authorizes "fair share impact fees" for any public facilities that are
categorically identified in the comprehensive plan and in the capital
improvements budget, it does not go so far as the Texas legislation in
specifying that fees may be used to pay the initial costs of acquiring
land, conducting a survey and the like.
6. Vermont Impact Fees
In July 1989, the Vermont legislature approved general impact fee
legislation authorizing municipalities to assess impact fees as a condi-
tion of issuance of a zoning or subdivision permit for "any portion of
the costs of an existing or planned capital project that will benefit or is
attributable to the users of the development" or "to compensate the
municipality for any expenses it incurs as a result of construction." 3
Fees may be levied to recoup the costs of capital outlays for a capital
project that will benefit the users of the development. A developer may
perform "offsite mitigation" in lieu of an impact fee or as compensation
for damage to important land, such as prime agricultural land or an
important wildlife habitat.
Though not nearly as lengthy or detailed as the Texas impact fee
legislation, the Vermont statute contains a definitions section, specific
82. 1988 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1022.
83. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5200-5206.
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adoption procedures, standards for determining the amount of a fee
and provision for the exemption of "certain types of development.",8 4
7. Virginia Road Improvement Impact Fees
Virginia has recently adopted special impact fee legislation, effective
July 1990, which authorizes certain counties and cities to assess impact
fees on new development in order to pay all or a part of the cost of
"reasonable road improvements attributable in substantial part to such
development." 5 The legislation is similar to the Illinois and Tennessee
road impact fee legislation. It contains a definition of "road improve-
ments" (including construction, expansion or improvement, but not in-
cluding on-site construction required under subdivision law). Service
districts must be established, and a road improvements plan must be
adopted, which must contain specific information and must be noticed
for public hearing. The legislation specifies times for assessment and
collection of fees, assessed before site plan approval, or building permit
or certificate of occupancy issuance.
Fees are not assessed if the developer has previously "proffered" off-
site road improvements accepted by the local government. Credits are
also to be given for any other dedication, construction or contribution
of off-site road improvements.
Finally, the legislation restricts the use of funds for road improve-
ments within the service area as set out in the road improvements plan
for the service area or district; earmarking of funds is required; refunds
must be made if funds are not expended within six years; and upon
project completion, any fees in excess of fifteen percent over the actual
cost of construction must be refunded.
The recently enacted impact fee enabling statutes described above
illustrate the increased willingness of state legislatures to allow impact
fees as a financing source for capital facilities and services, provided
that stringent standards and procedures are followed. They also illus-
trate the effects of political compromise. The statutes' inclusion of
some political subdivisions, and not others, or the authorization of im-
84. § 5205 provides that:
A municipality may exempt certain types of development from any part or all of
the impact fee assessed, provided that the exemption achieves other policies or
objectives clearly stated in the municipal plan. The policies or objectives may in-
clude, but are not limited to, the provision of affordable housing and the retention
of existing employment or the generation of new employment.
85. VA. CODE ANN., § 15.1-498.1 to 15.1-498.10 (1989).
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pact fees to recoup the cost of some capital facilities but not others, is
evidence for those who believe in the old maxim that one is better off
never knowing what goes into the making of laws, or sausages.
C. Other Sources of Authority for Impact Fees
With the enactment of new impact fee enabling legislation in various
states, there is no doubt that some local governments, expressly author-
ized under the legislation, and home rule units of local government
have the authority to impose impact fees for various types of public
improvements. But what about local governments that are not among
those empowered to adopt impact fees under impact fee statutes, and
non-home rule units of local government? And what about impact fees
for public improvements that are not authorized under the impact fee
enabling legislation? These questions are answered by looking to the
intent of the state legislatures that enacted the new impact fee legisla-
tion and other sources of local government powers-namely, the police
power and home rule powers.
1. Non-Home Rule. Authority
Typically, non-home rule units of local government have only those
powers that are expressly "granted to them by law" or fairly implied. 6
The initial inquiry, therefore, is whether the authority to impose im-
pact fees is expressly "granted to them by law." No state law explicitly
gives non-home rule units of local government the authority to adopt
impact fees. Impact fee legislation in most states expressly limits the
power to adopt impact fees to either large local governments or home
rule units of local government. Especially if state legislation has estab-
lished extensive regulations in a given subject area, a court might find
that the authority of non-home rule governmental units is either non-
existent or limited to impact fees regulations which are consistent with
the state enabling legislation.
In Illinois, for example, where the new road impact fee legislation is
expressly limited to only large counties (of over 400,000 in population)-
and home rute municipalities, local officials of non-home rule counties
and municipalities are uncertain whether the new legislation represents
86. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.011 (Municipal Home Rule Powers Act); ILL.
CONST. art. 7, § 7 (1970) (limiting the powers of non-home rule counties and municipal-
ities to only powers granted to them by law, and certain specified powers, none of which
is useful as authority for impact fees).
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the intent of the Illinois legislature to preclude them from enacting im-
pact fees to finance other types of public facilities and services pursuant
to other sources of authority.
Generally, non-home rule units of local government that seek to
adopt impact fees other than those expressly authorized by enabling
legislation must rely on zoning and planning enabling statutes and
other statutes governing the planning and financing of educational fa-
cilities, water and sewer facilities, and other types of public facilities
and services, to the extent that the authority to adopt impact fees may
be expressly or impliedly "granted to them by law" in these other
statutes.
Where statutes do not expressly authorize non-home rule units of
government to adopt impact fees for any type of public facility or ser-
vice, the analysis must focus on whether any authority to adopt impact
fees for particular types of public facilities is implied. In most states,
the scope of authority under planning, zoning and subdivision enabling
statutes does not expressly mandate the preparation of a capital im-
provements plan or authorize financing mechanisms to implement such
plans. Only a few states have mandated capital improvements plan-
ning or addressed the adequacy of public facilities in general enabling
acts.87 Thus, in most states, non-home rule units of local government
have insufficient capital facilities financing authority under general
planning and zoning enabling statutes to justify the adoption of impact
fees. This is especially true with respect to extraterritorial
development."8
2. Home Rule Authority
At the turn of the century, the popular wisdom was that municipali-
ties were not capable of governing themselves without detailed gui-
dance from the state legislatures. As a result, many courts strictly
limited municipal powers to those expressly granted (or fairly implied
in grants) by the state legislature. Prior to constitutional home rule
87. See, eg., Delaware's Quality of Life Act, 66 Del. Laws 207 (1988), requiring
counties to adopt comprehensive plans including a 5-year capital improvements plan;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(3)(a), requiring local governments to formulate compre-
hensive plans, including a capital improvements element, for maintaining an adequate
level of service capacity for public facilities; N.J. STAT. ANN § 52:18A-196 to -208
(West 1986 & Supp. 1989).




amendments, municipal powers were strictly construed under what is
known as "Dillon's Rule."8 9 As local governments later sought to per-
form more functions, state legislatures became swamped with requests
for local enabling legislation authorizing even day-to-day aspects of lo-
cal government. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many overworked
legislatures enacted constitutional amendments giving larger munici-
palities the power to exercise any power and perform any function per-
taining to their government and affairs, except subject areas in which
state jurisdiction was expressly reserved as exclusive.9' Only a few
state legislatures refused to loosen tightly-held state control over local
government powers. 91
Whether or not a local government is acting in an area "pertaining
to its local government and affairs" is a matter to be determined by the
courts.92 Likewise, whether the state legislature has retained exclusive
power over a subject area is also usually a matter of judicial
interpretation.
93
State legislatures may expressly preempt local regulations by provid-
ing that the regulation of a particular subject is a "matter of statewide
concern" or is exclusively reserved to the state.94 The legislature may
89. Dillon's Rule, named after the judge who authored the rule, was first set forth in
1 1. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th
Ed. 1911), as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation pos-
sesses and can exercise the following powers, and not others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the pow-
ers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation, -not simply convenient, but
indispensable.
Id. (emphasis in original).
90. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 7,
§ 6(a).
91. See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
92. See, e.g., Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
1145, 1149 (1966) (noting strict judicial interpretation of local authority by New York
courts); City of Highland Park v. County of Cook, 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 344 N.E.2d 665
(1975) (holding that the approval of state-funded, county highways was not within mat-
ters of local concern to a home rule municipality under provisions of the Illinois High-
way Code).
93. Ohio courts have held that the state's power over the public school system is
unquestioned. See Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio, 3 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 24
(1975) (citing City of East Cleveland v. Board of Educ., 112 Ohio St. 607, 148 N.E. 350
(1925)).
94. For example, the Delaware Beach Preservation Act expressly states that
"[a]uthority to enhance preserve and protect-public and private beaches within the State
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also impliedly preempt local regulations by providing for the "compre-
hensive regulation" of an activity.95 In determining whether or not the
state legislature intended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of
all local regulations, the following questions are relevant:
Does the ordinance conflict with state law; is the state law, ex-
pressly or impliedly, to be exclusive; does the subject matter reflect
a need for uniformity; is the state scheme so pervasive or compre-
hensive that it precludes coexistence of municipal regulation; and
does the ordinance stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the
legislature?9 6
The fact that a state law contains detailed and comprehensive regu-
lations on a subject does not, by itself, establish the intent of the legisla-
ture to occupy the entire field to the exclusion of local legislation.97 If
a statute regulating a particular subject does not expressly limit home
rule powers to regulate the same subject, a home rule unit is usually
authorized to adopt regulations concurrently with the state.98
The general principles set out above can be reduced to the proposi-
tion that home rule powers do not extend to matters over which a state
legislature has clearly reserved control.99 Local governments are only
authorized to assess impact fees pursuant to home rule powers if it can
shall be vested solely in the Department [of Natural Resources and Environmental Con-
trol]." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6803(a). See also State v. Putnam, 552 A.2d 1247
(Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (invalidating local beach erosion regulations on grounds of state
preemption).
95. It has been suggested that Florida's comprehensive state system of regulating
and financing schools may preempt local school impact fee regulations. See Bosselman
& Stroud, Pariah to Paragon: Developer Exactions in Florida 1975-85, 14 STETSON L.
REv. 527, 555 (1985).
96. 6 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 20.34 (3d. ed.
1980).
97. Id.
98. See Boulder Builders Group v. City of Boulder, 759 P.2d 752 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that Growth Ordinance, limiting number of building permits for new
dwelling units issued each year was not preempted by state Population Advisory Coun-
cil Act, but rather subject of population growth was matter of mixed state-local con-
cern); Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 71 N.Y.2d 126, 518 N.E.2d
920, 524 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1987) (holding that state Mined Land Reclamation Law did not
preempt town from enforcing its zoning law so as to bar extractive mining operations).
99. Thus, it would be incongruous for the state to reserve sole and exclusive author-
ity to itself in general enabling statutes (e.g., planning, zoning and subdivision statutes),




be established that the financing of a particular type of facility or ser-
vice is a matter of local concern, and not the exclusive jurisdiction of
the state or other government unit. This is usually established by
looking to statutory authority to plan and provide for the type of facili-
ties in question, such as state highway codes, water and sewer district
statutes, and the like. The types of facilities that are most vulnerable to
attack on grounds of state preemption are state highways,o ° public
schools' 01 and environmentally-related facilities, such as erosion con-
trol facilities"0 2 or regional solid waste disposal facilities. 10 3 These are
subject areas that have been extensively regulated through state consti-
tutional provisions or statutes, and over which states have asserted
strong control.
A sample of statutes relating to the planning and financing of specific
types of facilities is provided below to illustrate the type of analysis that
a court would likely apply to determine whether certain types of im-
pact fees are matters of local concern subject to home rule authority.
A. POWER OVER HIGHWAYS
Most states have enacted a body of laws pertaining to the planning,
construction, maintenance and financing of roads and highways."
Road impact fee legislation may be included in state highway codes. In
Illinois, the language and the legislative history of new road impact fee
legislation reveals the intent of the state legislature to allow the contin-
ued existence of transportation impact fee ordinances adopted pursuant
to home rule powers, provided that these ordinances comply with the
100. See Albany Area Builders Association v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372,
546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989) (invalidating transportation impact fees on
preemption grounds).
101. This is due in part to requirements in many state constitutions and statutes
that the state provide for a "uniform system" of free public schools. See, e.g., FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1 (1970); Wis. CONST. art. 10, § 3.
102. See State v. Putnam, 552 A.2d 1247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).
103. See Danne, Applicability of Zoning Regulations to Waste Disposal Facilities of
State or Local Governmental Entities, 59 A.L.R.3d 1244, 1270-72 (1974) (characterizing
the licensing of waste disposal facility licensing and permitting as increasingly a matter
of statewide importance).
104. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 37-39 (West 1968 & 1989 Supp.) (regarding
highway construction budget and contracting); Illinois Highway Code, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1989).
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substantive and procedural standards set out in the statute.10 5
B. SCHOOL FACILITIES
Several state courts have upheld local authority to require developers
to contribute school sites or money-in-lieu as a condition to subdivision
approval under statutes expressly authorizing school fees,' ° 6 or under
general planning and subdivision enabling statutes.10 7 The issue of
whether school impact fees may be validly adopted solely under the
home rule powers of a local government has never been addressed. As
previously discussed, constitutional requirement that states establish a
"uniform system" of free public schools presents special significant
problems for school impact fees. 108
C. PARKS AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
It is almost certain that a court would find that the provision (e.g.,
planning and financing) of neighborhood and municipal park and rec-
reational facilities to serve new growth and development is a matter of
local concern that is subject to the exercises of home rule power."
However, it is unlikely that the planning or financing of state parks or
105. See transcript of the Illinois House of Representatives debate on June 30, 1989,
immediately preceding the vote to adopt the Illinois Road Improvement Impact Fee
Law, described in, supra notes 58-79 and accompanying text.
106. See Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist., 29 Cal.
3d 878, 705 P.2d 876, 218 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985) (en bane) (holding that School Facili-
ties Act, CAL. GovT CODE ANN. § 65974 et seq., authorizing local jurisdictions to re-
quire the payment of school impact fees for the construction of temporary and
permanent school facilities as a condition of subdivision approval, did not preempt local
authority to impose additional fees for permanent school facilities).
107. See Cimmarron Corporation v. Board of County Commissioners of County of
El Paso, 193 Colo. 164, 563 P.2d 946 (1977) (en bane), holding that a petitioner for
approval of a subdivision plat may be required, under COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-
133(4)(a) and 30-28-133(4)(a)(II) (1973), to dedicate land for school and park sites or
pay a fee in lieu of such dedication, but not both.
108. The constitutional mandate for uniform, free public schools in Florida was
successfully relied upon by homebuilders in Florida to defeat an educational facilities
impact fee ordinance in Northeast Florida Builders Association v. St. Johns County,
No. 88-728CA-P (Fla. Cir. Ct., April 17, 1989), affid, No. 89-861, Fla. Dist. Ct. of
Appeals (5th Dist. April 5, 1990).
109. Note that statutory authority for park and recreational impact fees is poten-
tially more limited than home rule authority. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 141
A.D.2d 607, 529 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1988) (invalidating recreation fee imposed as a condi-
tion of site plan approval, where local law was in direct contravention of state law
authorizing fees as a condition of subdivision plan approval).
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facilities owned by a special park district, would fall within the scope of
home rule regulation.
D. WATER AND SEWER FACILITIES
Water and sewer facilities are another type of public facility which a
court would almost certainly find to be a matter of municipal concern
subject to exercises of home rule power. Locally-imposed water and
sewer connection fees or tap-in fees have been upheld in several
states.'1 o
E. OTHER UTILITIES
Depending on the level of responsibility or control that local govern-
ments have over the planning and financing of other types of utilities,
such as gas and electric utilities, a court might find some basis for the
adoption of impact fees or some type of connection fees for these facili-
ties. More commonly, however, courts have found that state laws gov-
erning public utilities, and rate-based financing of utility structures,
preempt local governments from collecting fees to finance these
facilities."'
F. POLICE, FIRE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES
The planning, administration and financing of municipal police, fire
and emergency medical services has traditionally been a matter of mu-
nicipal, rather than county or statewide concern. It is therefore likely
that a court would find that the financing of these services is within the
scope of the home rule powers of municipalities.
In summary, as a general rule, home rule units of local government
have broad powers to adopt regulations relating to the provision of
public facilities and services provided that the provision of a particular
110. See Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah
1981); Amherst Builders Ass'n v. City of Amherst, 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 402 N.E.2d 1181
(1980); Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d
314 (Fla. 1976); Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary District, 23 Ill. 2d 109, 177 N.E.2d 214
(1961).
111. See Rowe v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland, 56
Md. App. 23, 466 A.2d 538 (1983), upholding a declaratory judgment that Montgom-
ery County charter amendment proposing to prohibit contracts for goods and services
with telephone company unless outlying suburban rates were limited to the same rates
charged to other ratepayers was unconstitutional, and in conflict with general public
laws governing telephone rates.
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facility or service is a matter of local concern, and not the concern of
the state or another local government. The sample of statutes and re-
lated case law discussed above indicates that most of the "traditional"
public facilities (e.g., roads, water and sewer) are matters over which
local governments have some planning or financing responsibility, and
therefore valid subjects for impact fee regulations imposed pursuant to
home rule powers. Other types of public facilities, over which states
have reserved greater control, such as public schools and public utili-
ties, are weaker candidates for impact fee financing based on home rule
authority.
3. Authority to Regulate New Development Outside Corporate
Limits (Extraterritorial Jurisdiction)
A municipality's authority to collect impact fees from new develop-
ments located outside its corporate limits is another emerging issue as
cities and counties begin to compete with one another for the right to
assess fees. The issue is basically, whether the city or the county has
the right to regulate new development within the extraterritorial zone
surrounding a municipality.
Home rule powers to zone usually do not extend outside of the cor-
porate limits of the municipality. As the Illinois Supreme Count con-
cluded in Krughoff v. City of Naperville, "a home rule municipality
possess[es] the same statutory powers to zone extraterritorially as non-
home-rule municipalities.""1 2 Recognizing that home rule units have
only statutory planning, zoning and subdivision powers within their
extraterritorial zones, the Krughoff court upheld the statutory author-
ity of a municipality to levy fees in lieu of land contributions for school
and park sites required to serve the estimated population of a proposed
extraterritorial subdivision. Thus, this case illustrates the potential
strength of extraterritorial planning and subdivision power as a source
of authority for the adoption of impact fees for both home rule and
non-home rule municipalities.
With respect to new subdivisions or planned unit developments
(PUDs) located just outside the corporate limits of a municipality, a
court would be much more likely to uphold the authority of a munici-
pality to adopt impact fees pursuant to its statutory subdivision powers
112. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (citing
City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 61111. 2d 483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975)) (holding in part
that the 1970 Constitution did not confer extraterritorial sovereign or governmental
powers on home rule units of local government).
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than it would be to uphold the authority of a county to adopt impact
fees pursuant to its statutory zoning powers.
113
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO DEVELOPER ExACTIONS
This part of the Article examines the impact of judicial decisions on
the types of public facilities that may be funded through development
exactions, the timing of the exactions, the development approval con-
text in which they are imposed and the extent to which judicial stan-
dards have been incorporated in newly-adopted impact fee legislation.
A. Types, Location and Timing of Exactions
The range of public facilities that have been either constructed or
funded by developers through the development approval process has to
some extent depended on the level of judicial scrutiny applied by state
courts in specific types of development approval contexts and the strin-
gency of the state's standards for constitutionally valid exactions.
1. Types of Public Facilities Funded
Early developer exactions funded a limited array of public facilities,
including road widening," 4 parks and schools,115 and extension of
water and sewer lines." 6 Second generation impact fees now fund a
broader range of facilities, including intersection improvements and
traffic signals," 7 public buildings,' and public services, such as po-
113. See City of Urbana v. County of Champaign, 76 Ill. 2d 63, 389 N.E.2d 1185
(1979), holding that within the City's 1-1/2 mile extra-territorial planning jurisdiction,
the County's zoning authority preempts the City's; but, in pure subdivision matters, the
City's authority preempts the County's authority.
114. See, eg., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1
(1949) (upholding mandatory dedication of road widening improvements adjacent to
proposed subdivision).
115. See M. BROOKS, MANDATORY DEDICATION OF LAND OR FEES-IN-LIEU OF
LAND FOR PARKS AND SCHOOLS (American Society of Planning Officials, Planning
Advisory Service Report No. 266, 1971).
116. Contractor & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314
(Fla. 1976) (upholding connection fees for expansion of sewer facilities to new
development.)
117. J. FRANK & R. RHODES, DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 127 (1987) (citing re-
sults of 1985 national survey of exactions use conducted by Homer Hoyt Center for
Land Economics and Real Estate at Florida State University).
118. St. Johns County, Florida, is currently defending its impact fee ordinance,
which assesses fees for "public capital facilities" including police and law enforcement
buildings, motor vehicles, jails, communications equipment and any other equipment
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lice, fire119 and emergency medical services. 120
2. Location
Early forms of developer exactions, such as dedication requirements,
were limited to contributions of land or money for public facilities lo-
cated on the site of the proposed new development. Recent surveys
indicate that municipalities frequently rely on the use of fees imposed
as conditions of development approval to finance off-site community-
wide or regional facilities needed to serve new development.121 While
there are few judicial opinions that directly address the issue of the
validity of exactions of land or money for off-site public improvements,
it is apparent that some cases most probably involved fees for off-site
facilities. 122
One of the forces behind the genesis of second generation impact fees
in some states was the need for a more flexible form of exaction that
would allow for the planning and financing of large community-wide
or regional public improvements and services. Most "first generation"
impact fees adopted by local governments were designed to recover the
full cost of infrastructure improvements by requiring that fees be ex-
pended within one of several designated "benefit zones" or "service ar-
eas" within their jurisdictions. However, the demand for multi-
jurisdictional financing tools is apt to increase in the future. In many
of the high growth areas of the country, such as Southern California,
Northeastern Illinois, Central Florida and in corridors connecting ma-
jor cities, such as Washington, D.C.-Baltimore and New York-Phila-
delphia, planning and financing of public infrastructure is increasingly
related to police and law enforcement; fire protection and emergency medical buildings
and capital equipment; other public buildings and capital equipment for public pur-
poses, including but not limited to judicial facilities, county administration and opera-
tions facilities and offices for constitutional officers and their staffs, acquisition of sites
for public buildings and building design and facility need studies.
119. See J. FRANK, E. LINES & P. DOWNING, COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE WITH
FIRE IMPACT FEES: A NATIONAL STUDY (1985).
120. Citrus County, Florida, has adopted impact fees for a wide range of public
facilities and services, including fees for roads, parks, schools, fire, police, public build-
ings and emergency medical services (EMS).
121. See Bauman & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of
American Practices, 39 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1987).
122. This is especially true in cases involving city-wide or regional facilities. See,
e.g., Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Company, 96 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 422 N.E.2d 231
(1981) (involving "per unit" cash contributions by an extraterritorial subdivison for a
cultural center, though not reaching the issue of validity).
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necessary on a regional level. Thus, second generation impact fee legis-
lation frequently reflects an adaption to accommodate regional infra-
structure financing needs.123
In addition to the imposition of impact fees on a multi-jurisdictional
basis, second generation impact fee ordinances usually provide for in-
ter-jurisdictional fees. This effort to collect impact fees in areas where
more than one local government has some authority to plan or finance
capital facilities is an issue which has prompted litigation. (See Part IV,
Implementation Issues.)
3. Timing
The timing of exactions, or the point in the development process at
which impact fees must be paid, is an important determinant of
whether the impact fees may be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher real estate prices or rents and, subsequently, whether the devel-
opment community is supportive of impact fees. 124 Impact fees are
imposed in two stages: assessment and collection. First generation im-
pact fees have generally set both assessment and collection at the build-
ing permit or certificate of occupancy stage of the development process.
However, in response to developers' needs to finance impact fees along
with other development costs,1 25 second generation impact fee legisla-
tion has provided for flexibility by assessing impact fees at an early
stage in the development process, when a developer is seeking financ-
ing, and requiring collection of impact fees at the point at which con-
struction is about to begin, that is, at the building permit or plat
approval stage.
126
123. For example, the San Diego Association of Governments has recently com-
pleted a report containing recommendations on regional growth management and re-
gional infrastructure financing, including consideration of regional development impact
fees to pay for a variety of public facilities.
124. For a more complete analysis of the factors effecting the "elasticity" of impact
fees, see SNYDER & STEGMAN, PAYING FOR GROWTH (1986).
125. In Georgia, for example, the Georgia Development Alliance has taken the po-
sition that impact fees must be assessed at a stage when financing is available, or when
construction commences. See Position Paper in response to Georgia HB 796, proposed
comprehensive statewide impact fee legislation, Nov. 1989.
126. See TEXAS LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.016 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (re-
pealed Aug. 28, 1989), providing for assessment of impact fees at any time during the
development approval and building process, and collection of fees at either the time of
recordation of a subdivision plat, the time of connection to the water or sewer system or
at the time of issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy.
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B. The Development Approval Context
As with other legal "innovations," it is typical for the courts to ap-
proach the unknown with caution until the technique is used more
widely and state legislatures have addressed the issue. Exactions and
impact fees have a greater chance of withstanding legal attack if im-
posed as a condition to traditional types of development approvals
(e.g., subdivision plat approvals 127 or rezonings) 12 1 or if required by
contract (e.g., preannexation or development agreements). 129 How-
ever, in the context of more discretionary, flexible development ap-
proval contexts, such as conditional or special use approvals, exactions
and impact fees have in some cases failed to withstand heightened judi-
cial scrutiny. 130
C. Constitutional Validity
The most common constitutional challenges to impact fees are the
arguments that they are unfair, arbitrary, unreasonable or without any
rational basis, in violation of developers' due process rights, or that
they are discriminatory in violation of the equal protection clause of
state and federal constitutions.
127. See, e.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d. 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951)
(upholding mandatory dedication of sewers as condition of plat approval); Petterson v.
City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956) (upholding requirement of curb
and gutter installation as condition of subdivision approval); Zastrow v. Village of
Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960) (upholding mandatory dedication
of water mains as condition of plat approval).
128. Rezoning ordiannce are generally viewed as legislative acts of local govern-
ment that are presumed to be valid. See generally MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §§ 18.27
(caution and respect for legislative determination) and 19.06 (presumption of constitu-
tionality of ordinances) (3d ed. 1989). A formidable burden of proof is usually placed
on the challenger of such an ordinance. Id. at § 18.23 (Proof; Presumption of Reasona-
bleness and Burden of Proof on One Asserting Unreasonableness).
129. See Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Develop-
ment Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65
N.C.L. REv. 957, 994-1038 (1987); Fulton, Wheeling and Dealing in California, 55
PLANNING 4-9 (Nov. 1989) (describing experiences under the nation's most widely used
and sophisticated development agreement law).
130. See T. Lassar, Zoning for Sale?, 47 URB. LAND 34 (1988); Municipal Arts
Society, et al. v. City of New York, et al., 137 Misc. 2d 832, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 800 (1987)
(severely chastising New York City's attempt to exact $40 million in subway improve-
ments and $57 million in cash in exchange for 20 percent density bonus and develop-
ment approval); cf Chrismon v. Guildford County, 354 S.E.2d 309 (N.C. App. 1988)
(upholding conditional use zoning so long ai the action is reasonable, nondiscriminatory
and in the public interest).
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State courts have developed various standards for determining when
exactions and impact fees are constitutionally valid. In some states,
new impact fee legislation has incorporated language from state court
opinions establishing the constitutional requirements for valid exac-
tions and impact fees.' 3 ' This practice creates confusion as to which
constitutional standard courts should apply-the standard which un-
derlies the statutory limitations on the method of calculation and the
amount of impact fees, or the standard established in judicial opinions.
For example, the new Illinois Road Improvement Impact Fee legis-
lation contains many of the same requirements and procedures for the
adoption of impact fee ordinances as the more comprehensive Texas
impact fee legislation. Although the Illinois legislation prescribes an
impact fee methodology that is similar to the methodology required by
Florida cases under the "rational nexus" standard, 132 road improve-
ment impact fees are expressly required to be "specifically and uniquely
attributable" to the need for road improvements generated by new de-
velopment. 133 Incorporation of the "rational nexus" methodology and
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" language in the same stat-
ute exemplifies the confusion that continues to plague even "second
generation" impact fees.
To a certain extent, second generation impact fees are a victim of the
"inbreeding" of language from early cases and statutes. State courts
and legislatures have borrowed and modified impact fee language and
legislation from one another to such an extent that it is becoming im-
possible for even experts to agree on which constitutional standard ap-
plies in a given state. 13' Terms like "reasonably related,"'
135
131. See, eg., 1990 IL. Legis. Serv. 968-77 (West) (to be codified at ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121, §§ 5-901 to 5-918) (requiring that an impact fee imposed be "specifically
and uniquely attributable" to the traffic demands generated by the new development
paying the fee).
132. For example, the Illinois legislation limits the amount of impact fees to the
"proportionate share" of the cost of improvements incurred by the unit of local govern-
ment in the provision of road improvements. 1990 Ill. Legis. Serv. 968-77 (West) (to be
codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 5-901 to 5-918). It requires evaluation of needs
and costs of road improvements within designated service areas (§ 5-906(b)), requires
that fees be deposited in interest bearing accounts earmarked for each service area (§ 5-
913), and to be expended only on road improvements within the service area (§ 5-914).
133. Id. at 5-906(a)(1).
134. In "Remarks to American Bar Association Panel on Development Exactions,"
distributed at August 9, 1987, ABA Symposium on "Property Rights Under the Consti-
tution," local government lawyers were advised to "interdict interstate breeding." The
remarks note that:
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"reasonable connection,"' 136 "subtantially related,"' 137 "substantially
advance,"' 38 "specifically and uniquely attributable to,' 139 "uniquely
attributable and fairly proportioned to,"'' "necessitated by and attrib-
utable to''141 and "attributable to"142 needs created by new develop-
ment, coexist in the case law and statutes of various states.
In the midst of the maddening mislabeling and lax use of similar
terms to connote different standards, a uniform methodology for calcu-
Local government officials have been deluged with articles, studies and books relat-
ing to various forms of development fees. A large percentage of local governments
around the country are attempting to ascertain what other governments are doing
in this field. Much of this work is by finance officers, engineers, planners and other
people without legal training. They are trading ordinances from different parts of
the country and are using the scissors and paste to patch together interbred con-
glomerates that may have mixed parentage from many states.
135. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05(B)(4) (1989) (requiring that the
"amount of any development fees assessed pursuant to this section must bear a reason-
able relationship to the burden imposed upon the municipality to provide additional
necessary public services to the development"); Ayres v. City Council of City of Los
Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949) (upholding dedication of streets adjacent to
proposed subdivision as "reasonably related to potential traffic needs").
136. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965)
(holding that the evidence in that case established a "reasonable basis" or a "reasonable
connection" between the required dedication of land or fees-in-lieu for school, park or
recreational sites and the need generated by the subdivision).
137. See City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (rex. 1984)
(upholding mandatory dedication of land or money in lieu of park land, as valid police
power regulation "substantially related" to the health, safety or general welfare of the
people).
138. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (affirming prior
holding that land use regulations must "substantially advance" legitimate state
interests).
139. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, para. 5-903, defining "specifically and uniquely
attributable," and para. 5-904, authorizing certain units of local government to impose
road improvement impact fees, which "shall not exceed a proportionate share of costs
incurred by a unit of local government which are specifically and uniquely attributable
to the the new development paying the fee...."
140. Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977) (holding
that required contributions of land or money in lieu of land for new school and park
facilities as "uniquely attributable to" and "fairly proportioned to" the need for new
school and park facilities created by the proposed developments).
141. This language is the hallmark of the Texas impact fee legislation. TEXAS LO-
CAL Gov'T CODE ANN. § 395.001 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN.,
§ 15.1-498.2 (effective July 1, 1990).
142. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5201(3) (1975) (defining "impact fee" as a fee
which will be used to cover "any portion of the costs of an existing or planned capital
project that will benefit or is attributable to the users of the development... ").
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lating impact fees, most commonly associated with the "rational
nexus" standard, is emerging. This section of the Article describes this
phenomenon and some of the "inbreeding" of the constitutional stan-
dards of different states.
1. The "Reasonable Relationship" Test
State courts in a few states, principally California, apply the deferen-
tial "reasonable relationship" or "rational basis" standard widely ap-
plicable to zoning regulations in most states. First articulated as early
as 1949 by the California Supreme Court in Ayres v. City Council of
City of Los Angeles, 43 this test requires that exactions bear some rea-
sonable relationship to the needs generated by the new development.
California courts have upheld fees based on general public need for
facilities caused by present and future subdivisions, rather than requir-
ing a closer link between particular subdivisions and the specific needs
generated by those subdivisions."
Ordinances imposing exactions or impact fees in "reasonable rela-
tionship" states are presumed to be constitutionally valid. The Texas
Supreme Court's decision to uphold an ordinance requiring fees in lieu
of dedication of park land, in City of College Station v. Turtle Rock
Corp. ,45 was largely based on the principle that "[t]he presumption
favors the reasonableness and validity of the ordinance. An 'extraordi-
nary burden' rests on one attacking a city ordinance."' 46 Despite the
"extraordinary burden" which the court placed on the ordinance chal-
lengers, the opinion contains language which is associated with the
more moderate "rational nexus" test, described in the following sub-
section."4 Therefore, this case may signify a shift toward a stricter
standard in exactions cases than the lenient "reasonable relationship"
test applied to determine the validity of other types of police power
regulations.
143. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) (upholding mandatory dedication of road
widening improvements adjacent to proposed subdivision).
144. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (upholding fees for recreational facilities).
145. 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
146. Id. at 805.
147. Id. at 806. The Turtle Rock court directed the trial court to consider, on re-
mand, both needs and benefits, as evidence of a "reasonable connection" between the
increased population arising from the proposed subdivision and the increased park and
recreation needs in the neighborhood. Id.
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In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a beach access exac-
tion, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commn,148 based on its finding
that the access requirement was not at all related to the purpose for
which it was required.19 The Nollan case, which affirms the Court's
adherence to the principle that land use regulations must "substantially
advance" a legitimate state purpose,' 50 suggests that a heightened stan-
dard of review has replaced the less stringent standard applied by Cali-
fornia and Texas courts in cases in which the challenger has alleged a
regulatory taking of private property for public purposes without just
compensation.
2. Emergence of the "Rational Nexus" Test
Most state courts apply some variation of the "reasonable connec-
tion" or "rational nexus" test to impact fees and other types of exac-
tions. The roots of this test are frequently traced to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the 1965 case of Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls.5' In that case, the court held that fees-in-lieu of dedication for
off-site educational and recreational purposes were a valid exercise of
the town's police power because there was a "reasonable connection"
between the need for additional facilities and the growth generated by
the proposed subdivision. The phrase "rational nexus" did not appear
until the 1983 Florida case of Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County.152
After a decade of impact fee litigation, Florida courts have refined the
"rational nexus" test, whereby an impact fee will be upheld so long as
the fee does not exceed the cost of the improvements required and the
improvements adequately benefit the development that is the source of
148. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 8.
151. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). See Delaney, et al., The Needs-Nexus
Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and
Linkage, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 152 (1987) (citing Jordan as leading case
establishing "the rational nexus test").
152. 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("In order to satisfy [dedication
and impact fee requirements from earlier Florida cases], the local government must
demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for additional
capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the subdivision. In addition,
the government must show a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the ex-
penditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the subdivision. In order
to satisfy this latter requirement, the ordinance must specifically earmark the funds




the fee. 153 The fact that the general community might benefit inciden-
tally from the improvements will not invalidate the fee. 154
The underpinning concepts for the rational nexus test, the limitation
of fees to an amount representing a "proportionate share" or "fair
share" of the cost of the improvements required by new development,
has been applied by courts and legislatures in several states. Need-
benefit analysis, another aspect of the rational nexus test, has found its
way into recent impact fee cases and statutes. 5 ' The "need" prong of
the test requires a determination of whether there is some reasonable
connection or rational nexus between the population growth generated
by new development and the need for additional capital facilities.156
The capital facilities needs of various types of new development are
usually calculated using a sophisticated formula. In simplified terms,
the formula usually multiplies the estimated demand for capital im-
provements by the cost of improvements, adjusted to subtract credits
for in-kind contributions, taxes or other charges for the same facilities
and the portion of the cost to be borne by the general public.
The benefit part of the test does not require that the fee payer be the
exclusive recipient of the benefit. The new public facilities or services
may also benefit the general public. However, the funds collected must
be earmarked and placed in a special fund to ensure that they actually
benefit the fee payer. 57 In addition, funds must be spent within a rea-
sonable time or be refunded to the fee payer. 58 This needs-benefit
analysis ensures that impact fees are charged proportionately to all new
developments that contribute to the need for new public facilities, and
153. Home Builders and Contractors Association of Palm Beach County, Inc. v.
Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 143-44 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding road impact fee ordinance.).
154. 446 So. 2d at 143-44.
155. See, e.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.
1984); supra notes 145-47 for a discussion of this case.
156. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of Palm Beach County
Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Banberry Development Corp. v.
South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981); Amherst Builders Ass'n v. City of Am-
herst, 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 402 N.E.2d 1181 (1980).
157. See City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984);
Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314
(Fla. 1976); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983).
158. Amherst Builders Ass'n v. City of Amherst, 61 Ohio St. 2d 345, 402 N.E.2d
1181 (1980).
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that the fees benefit these developments in a fair and proportionate
manner.
Since Jordan v. Menomonee Falls,5 9 a growing number of courts,
legislators and local government practitioners have recognized the real-
ity that the need for new public facilities and services is rarely the re-
sult of a single new development. As large tracts of land with
development potential have become rare, the days of mammoth, subur-
ban tract developments are numbered. Today, new development more
often takes the form of a large number of smaller developments and
redevelopments. The fiscal blame is harder to trace to one source. In-
stead, consideration of a multiplicity of variables and factors has con-
tributed to the infrastructure problem. The design of second
generation impact fee legislation increasingly reflects this effort to
weigh and consider these factors. For better or worse, the more recent
impact fee formulas at least attempt to apportion fairly the cost of new
capital facilities to all new development instead of unduly burdening a
single development or requiring an increase in general taxes.
The rational nexus test is now the most prevalent of the standards
which have emerged to date. Under a variety of labels, second genera-
tion impact fee statutes have already incorporated "proportionate
share" and need-benefit aspects of the rational nexus test.1"
3. The Illinois "Uniquely Attributable" and "Fairly Proportioned"
Test
Illinois has earned a reputation as a "pro development" state161
159. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
160. For example, "proportionate share" language is pervasive in recent impact fee
legislation, caselaw and literature. In addition, impact fee statutes enacted by Texas,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Illinois and Georgia (proposed) incorporate capital facil-
ities needs analysis by requiring that impact fees bear some relation to the need for
capital improvements identified in an adopted capital improvements plan. These stat-
utes also require that the fees benefit the fee payers by requiring that collected fees be
deposited in earmarked accounts for the service area in which the proposed develop-
ment is located.
161. Evidence to support this perception can be found in a 1979 statistical study of
zoning amendment litigation in Illinois and other states which found that the Illinois
trial court reversed the local zoning authority's decision in sixty-three percent of the
cases; the appellate court reversed the trial court thirty-nine percent of the time and
reversed the zoning authority decision in fifty-two percent of the cases. In only twenty
percent of the cases was the local zoning authority's decision upheld by both the trial
court and the appellate court. See HAAR, SAWYER & CUMMINGS, QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ZONING AMENDMENT LITIGATION: COMPUTER POWER AND LEGAL
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where the attempts of local planners and government officials to em-
ploy innovative land use programs are frowned upon by strict Illinois
courts. It has been nearly thirty years since the Illinois Supreme Court
first laid down the requirement, in the landmark case of Pioneer Trust
& Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,162 that mandatory dedi-
cations and other types of conditions to development approval be "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed development.
163
The unanswered questions which the test raises for local government
planners and officials interested in imposing impact fees today are: (1)
What methodology for measuring and assessing impact fees satisfies
the test? and (2) Is there any indication that Illinois courts will aban-
don the test in favor of the more lenient "rational nexus" standard?
The Illinois Supreme Court answered the methodology question in
part in the 1977 case of Krughoff v. City of Naperville.161 Contrary to
the views of some commentators that exactions are permissible only
when a proposed development is the "sole cause" of the needed public
facilities, 161 the Krughoff court held that the city had the power to re-
quire the dedication of land, or money in lieu of land, for school and
park sites because the evidence showed that the required contributions
were "uniquely attributable" and "fairly proportioned to" the need
generated by the proposed development. The goal in designing a con-
stitutionally valid impact fee methodology, under this new, second
REASONING (Report to the National Science Foundation, Contract SOC 76-23721
1979) (sample size: N = 54 Illinois appellate court cases).
162. 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (developer of a subdivision successfully
challenged the validity of an ordinance that required dedication of public grounds as a
condition of plat approval).
163. The test was first set out in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (striking down the Village's attempt to
require the developer of a subdivision to dedicate land for educational purposes).
164. 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d
892 (1977).
165. See Weinberg, A Primer on Acceptable Development Fees, ABA PROBATE &
PROPERTY J. 6, 7 (1989) (interpreting the "specifically and unique attributes" test from
Pioneer Trust, to require that the burden of exactions be borne by the developer "only if
the new project is the sole cause of the need for additional public facilities.") (emphasis
added); see also Alterman, Evaluating Linkage, and Beyond, 41 LAND USE LAW &
ZONING DIG. 3, 6 (1989) (describing the Illinois "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test as requiring "municipalities to prove that the need for the additional facilities to be
provided or financed through exactions is attributable to the new development alone")
(emphasis added); supra note 40.
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prong of the test, then, is to measure the "fairly proportioned" impact
of a given development on the type of public facility being funded.
The second question regarding the "specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable" test, as it was modified by the Krughoff case, is whether there is
any indication that Illinois courts will construe the test to conform to
the views expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.166
In the Nollan case, the Supreme Court, albeit somewhat ambigu-
ously, appeared to endorse the application of a "rational nexus" stan-
dard. Although the Court was obliged to invalidate the exaction of a
public beach access easement by the California Coastal Commission as
a condition to development approval based on the specific facts of that
case, the analysis employed was nonetheless consistent with the re-
quirement of a "rational nexus" between the developer exaction and a
legitimate public objective.16
Although a 1981 Illinois appellate court decision, Plote, Inc. v. Min-
nesota Alden Co.,168 has often been heralded as an indication that Illi-
nois courts may be leaning toward a more lenient constitutional
standard, subsequent decisions have given no conclusive evidence of
this. The Plote case involved a $100 per dwelling unit "contribution"
imposed by the Village of Schaumburg for a community cultural center
pursuant to an ordinance implementing a planned unit development
agreement. The court hinted that it would have invalidated the fee had
the developer not been estopped from challenging the validity of condi-
tions in the ordinance. The Plote court acknowledged the movement of
the Illinois Supreme Court toward a more liberal standard of construc-
tion of local power to impose conditions on development approval, but
at the same time also emphasized that "the test in Illinois is more de-
manding than a cursory search for some connection, however tenuous,
between the municipalities exaction and the public welfare."' 169 Con-
trary to the expectations of some legal commentators, since the Plote
decision, the Illinois courts have declined to take any cases involving
conditions to any type of development approval which are not in the
166. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
167. However, the Court affirmed in Nollan its earlier decisions requiring that con-
ditions which abridge individual property rights through the police power must "sub-
stantially advance a legitimate State interest." Id. at 834.
168. 96 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 422 N.E.2d 231 (1981).
169. Id. at 1006, 422 N.E.2d at 235.
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context of a preannexation agreement. 171
Eight years after the Illinois court's statements in Plote and two
years after the U.S. Supreme Court's nod toward the "rational nexus"
standard in Nollan, the Illinois courts have not squarely addressed the
proper constitutional standard applicable to impact fees. The defini-
tions of the terms "specifically and uniquely attributable" and "propor-
tionate share" in the new Illinois Road Improvement Impact Fee
Law' 7 ' are likely to increase the ambiguity in the courts regarding the
continued viability of a strict construction of the "specifically and
uniquely attributable" standard, rather than a more practical "rational
nexus" approach for showing the link between impact fees and new
development.
The Road Improvement Impact Fee Law adopted by the Illinois
General Assembly in 1989 limits the amount of the fee to a "propor-
tionate share" of the costs that will be incurred by the local govern-
ment unit in the provision of road improvements to serve the new
development. 172 The legislation defines the term "proportionate share"
as "the cost of road improvements that are specifically and uniquely
attributable to a new development" after consideration of certain fac-
tors listed in the definition.'17 Local government administrators may
justifiably ask what the term "proportionate share" really means.
"Proportionate share" is defined in the new legislation as costs that
are "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the total cost of road
improvements. This suggests that "proportionate share" requires that
fees are subject to the narrow and exacting interpretation of the "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" test as it was originally established
by the Illinois courts.
As first used by the Illinois Supreme Court in the 1960 case of Pio-
neer Trust & S. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,'74 the phrase "spe-
cifically and uniquely attributable" was interpreted as a narrow test
that effectively required a particular development to be the "sole
170. See, ag., The Village of Orland Park v. First Federal Savings, 135 Iln. App. 3d
520, 481 N.E.2d 946 (1985) (enforcing provisions of a preannexation agreement).
171. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-903 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (definitions).
172. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-906(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
173. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 5-903 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
174. 22 11. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (invalidating requirement of contribution
of cash and land for school and recreation purposes as condition to subdivision
approval).
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cause" of the need for the public improvements. 175 In 1978, in the case
of Krughoff v. City of Naperville,1 76 the Illinois Supreme Court liberal-
ized the test to require that dedication of land or money in lieu of land
be "uniquely attributable and fairly proportioned to" the need for new
public facilities. The word "specifically" was dropped and the phrase
"and fairly proportioned to" was added. The term "proportionate," in
common dictionary parlance, is "the comparative relation in size,
amount, etc., between things; a part, share, etc., especially in relation to
the whole." 177 After Krughoff, the original meaning of the so-called
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test can no longer be charater-
ized as an exacting, sole cause test after its marriage with the more
moderate "and proportionate to" language. The equation of the terms
"proportionate share" and "specifically and uniquely attributable" in
the 1989 legislation, at worst, threatens to take the Illinois courts back
to a very strict, "cause and effect" construction, which virtually guar-
anteed the invalidation of developer contributions for public facilities
needed to serve more than one new development. At best, the new
legislation confuses the issue of what is legally required to enact consti-
tutionally valid road impact fees.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
A. Impact Fee Methodology
The reasonableness of impact fees and other types of land use con-
trols depends upon good planning. The amount of an impact fee and
the method used to arrive at that amount are critical to the legality of
the fee. After a decade of impact fee litigation, planners in Florida
communities have accepted the necessity of becoming conversant in the
digitized language of population and household size projections, trip
generation models, level of service standards, tax credits, exemptions
and a host of other technical considerations that must be factored into
the formula to satisfy constitutional requirements.
As discussed in Part III of this Article, Illinois courts require that
mandatory contributions of land or money as conditions to develop-
ment approval be "uniquely attributable and fairly proportioned to"
the need for the new public facilities created by the proposed develop-
173. Id at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
176. 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1977).
177. WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY (Modem Desk Ed. 1979).
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ments.175 How does an Illinois planner ensure that impact fees are
"uniquely attributable to" and "fairly proportioned to" the need for
public facilities created by a proposed development? How one meas-
ures the "proportionate share" or "fair share" of the cost of public
facilities attributable to an individual unit of development has been the
subject of many planning conferences, workshops and publications.1 79
Illinois municipalities that have adopted impact fee ordinances calcu-
late the amount of the fee as a pro rata share of the total capital cost of
improvements as set out in the city's capital improvements budget (an
improvements driven impact fee) or as determined by a formula mea-
suring the amount of needed improvements for various types of land
uses (a needs driven impact fee). 10
Du Page County employed "needs driven" methodology when it
drafted its Fair Share Transportation Impact Fee Ordinane. 81 Re-
cently adopted impact fee ordinances, such as Du Page County's trans-
portation ordinance, illustrate the current level of planning and
documentation that is used to justify the adoption of the impact fee.
The County's transportation impact fee was based on approximately
three years of planning, during which consultants were hired to ana-
lyze the engineering, planning and legal aspects of impact fees and to
design a computerized transportation planning model to simulate
travel patterns and traffic volumes. In addition, County planning staff
engaged in the on-going process of updating the County's road im-
provements plan based on future projections of population and employ-
ment growth.
The Du Page County ordinance charges fees according to land use
type (e.g., single-family residential detached, multi-family attached, re-
178. Krughoff, 369 N.E.2d at 895 (upholding land dedication requirement, or
money in lieu of land, as a condition of plat approval, for school and park sites.)
179. See, eg., J. NICHOLAS, THE CALCULATION OF PROPORTIONATE-SHARE IM-
PACT FEES (APA, Planning Advisory Service Report No. 408, July 1988).
180. There are two general methods of calculating impact fees. A needs-driven
methodology is derived from a quantification of the service demands and the cost of
capital facilities needed to provide the demanded services. An improvements-driven
methodology allocates the cost of a specified list of capital improvements regardless of
an area's actual needs. The principal difference between the two systems is that the
needs-driven methodology avoids the possibility that the portion of new facilities needed
to overcome an existing deficiency will be allocated to new growth and development.
See also J. NICHOLAS, supra note 180, at 10.
181. Du PAGE COUNTY ORDINANCE No. DTO-016-88, effective January 1, 1989,
repealed and replaced by Du PAGE COUNTY ORDINANCE No. ODT-021-89, effective
June 27, 1989.
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tail or office use by size in square feet, etc.) and benefit district."8 2
When the ordinance first took effect on January 1, 1989, discounted
fees.. 3 ranged from a low of less than $200 per hotel room in one dis-
trict, to a high of almost $7,000 for a "High Turnover Restaurant" in
another district. Any person dissatisfied with the fee schedule may
elect to provide an "Individual Assessment of Impact" for a particular
development based on the formula provided in the ordinance. 18 4 The
"individual assessment" formula incorporates a determination of the
need for transportation improvements in number of "lane miles" gen-
erated by various types of land uses at specific times of the day. 1 5 It
then multiplies this number by the cost per lane mile to arrive at a
"total fee." This fee is then adjusted to subtract charges which the
developer has already contributed toward highway construction, such
as motor fuel taxes and the value of any highway improvements given
by the developer pursuant to an Improvement Credit Agreement.
B. Exemptions
Should impact fees be charged to all new developments? Although
local governments naturally have been sensitive to the harshness of fees
charged to public or quasi-public, not-for-profit landowners, the initial
approach of most jurisdictions has been to apply the fee "across-the-
board" with no exemptions, to avoid any claims of unfair or unequal
treatment by those who would not be exempted. Some Florida com-
munities have provided for exemptions for public schools, government
buildings, affordable housing and not-for profit organizations. Though
there are no judicial opinions l" 6 from any jurisdiction which address
182. The Original Illinois enabling legislation, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 § 5-608,
required the creation of benefit districts known as "transportation impact fee districts."
Pursuant to this requirement, Du Page County created ten transportation impact fee
districts. Fees must be expended in the district they are collected.
183. The "discounted fee" is calculated by adjusting the "total fee" to reflect a "tax
credit" (to safeguard against "double taxation" on account of gasoline and other taxes
paid toward the construction of highway improvements), a "14% Municipal Discount"
(to account for taxes paid to the municipality for highway improvements), and a "50%
Incentive Discount" (based on a policy decision to share costs and encourage
compliance).
184. Du PAGE COUNTY ORDINANCE No. ODT-021-89, § 10.
185. Number of trips generated on a weekday during "peak hours," adjusted for
"pass through" traffic, times average trip length in miles generated by a particular land
use type divided by lane mile capacity.
186. A report issued by the National Council for Urban Economic Development,
Development Fees: Sharing the Costs of Growth 12 (No. 43, March 1988), states that
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the validity of impact fee exemptions, the legal issues that would likely
be raised in a lawsuit challenging impact fee exemptions are whether
the local government has the authority to exempt some land users from
the impact fees and whether the exemption violates the state and fed-
eral equal protection clauses.
1. Affordable Housing
Because impact fees may increase the cost of new housing beyond
levels which are affordable to even middle-income residents, some ju-
risdictions have exempted affordable housing from the payment of im-
pact fees. Vermont is one state which expressly authorizes the
exemption of affordable housing in its impact fee enabling legisla-
tion.S 7 In other jurisdictions, which do not expressly authorize impact
fee exemptions, the exemption of affordable housing developments
would have to be based upon the local government's overall objective
of planning comprehensively for the orderly growth and development
of the community, including the encouragement of a variety of housing
types.18
8
An affordable housing exemption would likely withstand a constitu-
tional equal protection challenge as long as the local government can
demonstrate that exemption of that particular class of development is
rationally related to some legitimate government purpose, such as plan-
ning objectives, rather than for the sole purpose of creating a financial
subsidy for the exempt land use. The U.S. Supreme Court and Illinois
Supreme Court have emphasized that where no "suspect class" (e.g.,
race, nationality) or fundamental right is at stake, a government need
only show that its classification is rationally related to a legitimate gov-
"[s]ome courts have ruled that a locality's fee is not a fee when it exempts certain types
of development, but rather a discretionary tax-unless the locality in question has had a
consistent history of providing exemptions for certain types of developments." How-
ever, no cases are cited in support of this statement.
187. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, para. 5205, provides:
A municipality may exempt certain types of development from any part or all of
the impact fee assessed, provided that the exemption achieves other policies or
objectives clearly stated in the municipal plan. The policies or objectives may in-
clude, but are not limited to, the provision of affordable housing and the retention
of existing employment or the generation of new employment. (emphasis added)
188. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch., para. 3001, regarding the comprehensive plan-
ning powers of Illinois counties.
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ernment interest."8 9 To date, neither the federal nor the state courts
have held affordable housing to be a fundamental right. Thus, a court
would apply the same constitutional analysis that would be applied to
determine the validity of many other types of police power or economic
regulations. The only role of the courts would be to determine whether
the governing body enacting the impact fee ordinance "could rationally
have decided" that the exemption of affordable housing development
would achieve a legitimate public purpose.190
2. Public Buildings and Private Non-Profit Organizations
Public schools, other public buildings and non-profit organizations
have sometimes been exempt from impact fees. The long-standing
practice of exempting these uses from taxation has perhaps served as
the impetus for exempting them from impact fees. As discussed in Part
I, impact fees, if properly defined, are distinguishable from taxes in
their purpose and source of authority. Taxes are imposed for the pur-
pose of raising general revenue and are strictly limited by statutory
requirements. Impact fees, however, are intended to recoup costs ex-
pended by the local government in providing capital improvements to
new development. The tax-exempt status of not-for-profit institutions
does not require local governments to provide any special treatment
under land use regulations.
There is no difference in the legal requirements for the exemption of
not-for-profit organizations and other types of exemptions. Unless a
statute infringes on a fundamental right or discriminates against a sus-
pect class, differential treatment of a regulated class is judged under the
less stringent "rational basis" equal protection standard.
The exemption of public buildings and private non-profit organiza-
tions is constitutionally valid if reasonably related to comprehensive
land use planning objectives. Further, as in the case of affordable hous-
ing, a local government must be able to demonstrate that non-exempt
land uses are not subsidizing the exempt land uses. It is important to
note, however, that many not-for-profit institutions have at least as
great an impact on road systems and other public facilities as other
189. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
190. For discussion of the equal protection standard applied in cases not involving a
suspect class or fundamental right, see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S
229, 242 (1984); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981);
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
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land uses and it may therefore be difficult to provide the necessary
"reasonable relationship" which would be required to justify the ex-
emption. Furthermore, because the U.S. Constitution mandates "sepa-
ration of church and state," '19 1 the exemption of religious institutions
only, without any similar exemption for other institutions, from the
payment of impact fees is likely to be strictly scrutinized by the
courts.192 However, if some non-religious institutions were exempt as
well, the claim of government favoritism of churches is weakened.
3. "Vested" Developments
The understandable impulse, once developers hear of a proposed im-
pact fee ordinance, is to race to the local planning office to file applica-
tions for building permits before the proposed ordinance takes effect.
One of the issues that arises in adopting an impact fee ordinance, is
whether the vesting rules which apply to changes in zoning laws apply
to the adoption of impact fees. Under the most common type of vested
rights case, a court would be asked to determine the point at which a
developer's right to proceed under an old zoning ordinance, which is
superseded by new zoning regulations, becomes vested. The rule in
most states is that a developer does not acquire any vested rights to
proceed under the rules in effect at the time the development was ap-
proved unless a building permit was issued and the developer made
"substantial expenditures" in reliance on the permit. 193
Though it has never been established that traditional vesting rules
apply to impact fees, a recent Florida case, Key West, Fla. v. R.L.JS.
Corp.,194 upheld the city's right to require a developer to pay develop-
ment fees pursuant to an ordinance adopted after a building permit had
been issued and a substantial number of units had been constructed.
This case illustrates the developer's potential liability for impact fees
even after their developments have been approved.
191. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
192. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (holding that the exemp-
tion of religious periodicals from a sales tax statute violated the establishment clause of
the First Amendment).
193. Note that in Illinois the actual issuance of a building permit may not be neces-
sary. In American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. City of Chicago,
19 Ii. App. 3d 30, 311 N.E.2d 325 (1974), and Mattson v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. App.
3d 378, 411 N.E.2d 1002 (1980), the court held that an applicant for a building permit
had a vested right to the issuance of the permit because of substantial expenditures
made in reliance on the probability of issuance of the building permit.
194. 57 U.S.L.W. 2406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., No. 87-2810, Jan. 3, 1989).
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V. CONCLUSION
Impact fees have undergone significant changes since they were first
introduced in a number of states in the 1970s. After a decade of experi-
ence in implementing fees, courts and legislatures have ventured to
proclaim more definite standards and procedures for impact fees in an
effort to respond to some of the realities of real estate development and
to address questions of fairness. In general, these "second generation"
impact fees have attempted to accommodate developers' needs for pre-
dictability, local government needs for guidelines and consistency and
the special needs of some types of development through exemptions.
Second generation fees are typically assessed pursuant to complex
formulas and sophisticated ordinances that incorporate substantial ad-
ministrative, procedural and substantive requirements. The complex-
ity of the ordinances has increased, in large part, as a response to
pressures for less local discretion in the adoption of fees and greater
equity among fee payers. Modem impact fee ordinances may require
governing bodies to conduct public hearings on the assumptions which
underlie the impact fee formulas in addition to hearings on the pro-
posed impact fee ordinance itself. Ordinances which once applied
across-the-board, are now being "fine-tuned" to exempt certain land
uses (e.g., public buildings, non-profit organizations and affordable
housing).
On the negative side, the second generation impact fee legislation
may exacerbate, rather than resolve, the existing ambiguities in the in-
terpretation of constitutional tests for valid impact fees. This is partic-
ularly evident in states like Illinois, where the new legislation
incorporates language from older judicial opinions that may no longer
be viable in the modem context of land use and development. From a
more positive perspective, broad or ambiguous legislation provides an
opportunity for forward-thinking judicial opinions that hopefully move
the the majority of states to evaluate impact fees under a more practical
standard, whatever its formulation. Meanwhile, courts and legislatures
are likely to continue to amend and refine the law governing impact
fees.
In sum, "second generation" impact fee ordinances attempt to be
more equitable, provide more public input, and measure the amount of
fees as fairly as possible. These improvements have perhaps taken
place at the expense of more practical considerations, such as adminis-
trative cost and technical complexity. Whether or not all of the "sound
and fury" that has been expended in the design of more scientific and
1112
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equitable impact fees will ultimately signify anything is uncertain.
What is certain, however, is that the use and acceptance of impact fees
in states that have reached "the second generation" is becoming more
widespread. Like it or not, the new generation of impact fees is here to
stay and they are sure to play a prominent role in capital facilities fi-
nancing in the 1990s.
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